Heavy Hands, Magic, and Scene-Reading Traps by Stephen Neale
AbstrAct
This is one of a series of articles in which I ex-
amine errors that philosophers of language may 
be led to make if already prone to exaggerating 
the rôle compositional semantics can play in 
explaining how we communicate, whether by 
expressing propositions with our words or by 
merely implying them. In the present article, I 
am concerned less with “pragmatic contribu-
tions” to the propositions we express—contribu-
tions some philosophers seem rather desperate 
to deny the existence or ubiquity of—than I am 
with certain types of traps that those who exag-
gerate the rôle of semantic convention and un-
derestimate the rôle of pragmatic inference are 
apt to fall into.
Key words: semantics, pragmatics, definite de-
scriptions, demonstrative descriptions (deictic 
and descriptive uses of), singular terms, scope 
(ambiguities and generalized), psychological 
verbs
1. Heavy hands and magic
Among contemporary battles about the 
truth conditions of the propositions 
we express with sentences of natural 
language, we can distinguish the local 
and the global. Local battles are fought 
over specific examples, over the truth 
conditions (or finer-grained features) of 
the propositions expressed with specific 
sentences, interested parties disagreeing 
about the truth-conditional (or finer-
grained) facts. For many years, such 
disagreements were often skirmishes in 
a global battle about where to draw the 
line between what speakers state and 
what they merely imply.1 In the language 
of propositions, they were fights over 
where to draw the line between those 
77
HEAVY HANDS, MAGIC,  
AND SCENE-READING TRAPS
stEPHEN NEALE*
The Graduate center 
city University of New York
EUJAP  VOL. 3  No. 2  2007 
OrIGINAL scIENtIFIc PAPEr
 UDk: 1:81 
  165 
 
2
* I thank Alan berger, Paul Elbourne, Jeremy DeLong, 
Josh Dever, kevan Edwards, Jeff king, Michael Liston, 
Nathan salmon, and teresa robertson for illuminat-
ing and engaging correspondence on portions of this 
article and for straightening me out on all sorts of 
things.
1 This was the terminology employed by Grice (1961) 
before introducing his notions of saying and implicat-
ing in later work. see Grice 1989.
78
EUJAP  Vol. 3  No. 2  2007
propositions that speakers express and those they merely imply (expressing and 
implying being the dominant ways of communicating propositions by way of speech 
or writing). some philosophers like to use the modifiers ‘semantic’ and ‘pragmatic’ 
here, distinguishing propositions speakers semantically express and propositions they 
pragmatically imply. Others prefer to refrain because of another, more interesting, 
global battle that is not quite co-ordinate with the first. This is the battle between what 
I shall call, in a rare mood of detachment, heavy-handed semantics and heavy-handed 
pragmatics, a battle over the correct way of explaining truth conditions that are frequently 
not themselves in dispute: here, interested parties disagree about the division of labour, 
about the precise contributions to the truth conditions of propositions expressed made 
by compositional, truth-conditional semantics and by what has come to be known as 
intrusive, truth-conditional pragmatics. suppose I say to you, ‘When I leave, I’ll place 
a key under the flowerpot to the right of the front door’. Although I used ‘when I leave’ 
(rather than, say, ‘when I leave my house’) and although I used the noun phrases ‘a key’ 
(rather than, say, ‘a key to my car’) and ‘the front door’ (rather than, say, ‘the front door 
of my house’), it could well be the case that I used the sentence in question to express 
the proposition that when I leave my house, I’ll place a key to my car under the first 
flowerpot to the right of the front door of my house. so a question arises: is the full 
content of the proposition I expressed to be explained by heavy-handed pragmatics or 
by heavy-handed semantics, the latter aided by some heavy-handed syntax?
According to heavy-handed pragmatics, the example I just gave was of a case in which 
the proposition the speaker expressed outstripped in content what was supplied by a 
compositional semantics for the sentence uttered, even relative to the anchoring and co-
anchoring of the contents of any indexical or anaphoric expressions that sentence may 
contain.2 Heavy-handed semantics disagrees: the example was actually of a case in 
which, as in any other, the content of the proposition the speaker expressed was determined 
by, and only by, semantic composition on the contents of its syntactic constituents, some 
of which are not only indexical but also aphonic (i.e. devoid of all phonological content).3
Heavy-handed pragmatics usually involves one of three ways of describing how 
content that can (perhaps only in principle) be determined by compositional semantic 
mechanisms falls short of the content of the proposition the speaker expresses: (i) In 
terms of what many philosophers discussing uses of incomplete definite descriptions 
2 see Neale (2004, 2005b, 2007) for a potted history of heavy-handed pragmatism, which I call “linguistic pragma-
tism”, and some specific pragmatist explorations. The locus classicus of contemporary pragmatism is sperber and 
Wilson (1986). Excellent sourcebooks are carston (2002) and récanati (2004).
3 A phonic is an item of syntax that has phonetic properties, an aphonic is one that does not. since ‘aphonic’ can 
function as both an adjective and a noun, we can use it to avoid such nominal mouthfuls as ‘phonologically empty 
element’ and ‘phonetically null element’, and to avoid the adjectival mouthfuls ‘phonologically empty’ and ‘pho-
netically null’. (All aphonics are homophonic I suppose, but it does not follow that all aphonics affect the totality 
of phonic features of a sentence in the same way.) since ‘indexical’ can also function as an adjective and a noun, 
‘indexical aphonic’ and ‘aphonic indexical’ are strictly interchangeable. However, for purposes of emphasis, one 
may be more useful than the other in certain contexts.
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(‘the table’, ‘the murderer’, ‘the emperor’, ‘the mayor’, and so on) have called ellipsis 
(not to be confused with a syntactic notion in generative grammar often known as 
ellipsis, deletion or elision).4 (ii) In terms of what sperber and Wilson (1986) call the 
underdetermination of propositions by the meanings of the linguistic forms we use 
to express them (even relative to assignments of referents to singular terms and the 
specification of any anaphoric links).5 Or (iii) in terms of what Perry (1986) has called 
unarticulated constituents of the propositions we express.6
We are in virtually the same territory with the concepts mentioned in (i)-(iii), though 
talk of underdetermination appears to involve subtleties and allow for interpretive 
possibilities not obviously captured by talk of ellipsis and unarticulated constituents, and 
talk of utterance ellipsis certainly facilitates general characterisations of unarticulated 
constituents and underdetermination. There is no need, however, to get embroiled in 
these matters here. The basic point is that in heavy-handed pragmatics non-semantic 
factors bear on the contents of the propositions we express.
Heavy-handed semantics is syntactically ham-fisted unless supported by a plausible 
syntactic theory that justifies repeated appeals to aphonic “indexical” expressions, for 
it must postulate their presence in examples as diverse as the following, assuming they 
are used to express whole propositions: ‘smith left a key under the flowerpot to the 
left of the door’, ‘Every villager is happy’, ‘Every villager who owns a donkey feeds the 
donkey at night’, ‘There’s no wine’, ‘No-one has drunk any wine’, ‘The russian voted for 
the russian’, ‘smith hasn’t had measles’, ‘smith hasn’t had breakfast’, ‘smith is ready’, 
‘smith has finished’, ‘smith has had enough’, ‘smith left’, ‘smith used a gun’, ‘It’s raining’, 
‘It’s noon’, ‘two sugars, please’, and ‘Only if you promise not to tell anyone’.7
More importantly for present concerns, heavy-handed semantics is semantically ham-
fisted unless supported by a theory of “indexicality” that is not just heavy-handed 
pragmatics in formal disguise. Indeed, it is important for philosophers and linguists not 
be misled by the rhetoric of some heavy-handed semanticists, rhetoric in which heavy-
handed pragmatics is said to invoke “magic” where heavy-handed semantics invokes 
only well-undertood semantic mechanisms.8 For the following must be conceded by 
both sides at the outset:
4 bach (1981), Donnellan (1968), Husserl (1913), Neale (1990, 2004, 2007), Quine (1940), sellars (1954).
5 see also carston (2002) and récanati (2004).
6 see also crimmins (1993), crimmins and Perry (1989), récanati (2002), and Neale (2007). 
7 see sperber and Wilson (1986), carston (2002), récanati (2004), Neale (2005b, 2007). some authors say sen-
tences themselves have as their meanings, or encode, partial, gappy, or incomplete propositions, and that this is the 
source of much underdetermination. but it seems to me the semantics of a sentence is a very different type of entity 
from the sort of thing a speaker expresses with that sentence. In Neale (2004, 2005b, forthcoming a) I prefer to talk 
of sentences encoding blueprints for propositions. No proposition blueprint is itself a proposition (any more than 
a building blueprint is a building). Many distinct propositions (or buildings) may satisfy a single blueprint.
8 I have in mind here especially stanley (2002a, 2002b). see below. It is strange that people on both sides of this 
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(a) Nothing like the formal mechanisms of compositional semantics determines 
the propositional contents of (at least particularized) conversational implicatures, or 
the propositions we convey by utterances replete with metaphor, irony, anacoluthon, 
aposiopesis, etc.
(b) such contents are (at least partly) functions of speaker’s intentions. 
(c) The mechanisms of compositional semantics do not give hearers the means even 
to assign referents to all singular terms or to resolve all lexical, structural or anaphoric 
ambiguities, let alone to identify the full contents of utterances replete with metaphor, 
irony, anacoluthon, or aposiopesis, or to identify the contents of any conversational 
implicatures.
(d) The hearer will have to pragmatically infer such content. 
In short, everyone in the business of explaining how we use language to communicate 
is, by virtue of his or her job description, already up to his or her neck in the magic of 
pragmatics. Furthermore, it must be conceded by both sides that:
(e) The mere existence and use of purportedly indexical words such as ‘I’, ‘you’, ‘he’, 
‘she’, ‘it’, ‘here’, ‘there’, ‘now’, ‘then’, ‘today’, ‘tomorrow’ and ‘yesterday’ demonstrates that 
in order to have any plausibility whatsoever a compositional semantic theory must 
distinguish, at least for these words, the abstract notion of the meaning of an expression, 
which kaplan (1989) has dubbed its character, from what the expression is used to 
refer to on a given occasion of utterance, which kaplan has dubbed its (propositional) 
content.
(f) For some of these words, it has seemed appealing to some semanticists to view 
character as a precise rule or recipe that determines content on occasions of use, a 
function from “contexts” to contents, which is why many semanticists have invoked 
formal “contexts” to serve as the arguments of characters.
(g) No such rules or recipes exist for determining the contents of, for example, 
‘everyone’, ‘every student’, ‘no-one’, ‘no politician’, ‘the murderer’, ‘the mayor’, ‘the 
emperor’, ‘the front door’ or ‘a key’, on particular occasions of use. (Vague talk of 
“salient” objects or properties (or “salient” sets or functions!) hardly constitutes the 
provision of such rules.)
debate have billed themselves as mavericks fighting the traditional, establishment, or orthodox position (or as-
sumption). On the side of heavy-handed pragmatics, récanati suggests he is fighting against the traditional, estab-
lishment, or orthodox position (or assumption) that every constituent of the proposition expressed by someone 
uttering a sentence S (or expressed by an utterance of S) is traceable to an item in S’s syntax; and, on the side of 
heavy-handed semantics, stanley suggests he is fighting against the traditional, establishment, or orthodox posi-
tion (or assumption) that it is not the case that that every constituent is traceable to an item in S’s syntax! certainly 
both are fighting on behalf of and against different traditions, but talk of fighting orthodox or establishment posi-
tions (or assumptions) strikes me as faintly absurd (though, no doubt good for grants and sales!).
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(h) The meanings of certain nouns are such that understanding the propositions 
speakers express with sentences that contain them requires identifying what are 
sometimes called implicit arguments: ‘mother’, ‘king’, ‘mayor’, ‘emperor’, and ‘murderer’, 
for example.9 (In some cases, the meaning appears to signal that more than one 
argument is called for: ‘ambassador’, for example.) In the right circumstances, I may use 
the sentence ‘The next mayor will have a tough time’ to express the proposition that the 
next mayor of New York will have a tough time. As I noted in Descriptions, Husserl once 
said “When a contemporary German speaks of ‘the Emperor’, he means the present 
German Emperor” (1913, p. 85). A literal reading of this remark suggests a precise rule 
or recipe that determines content on the basis of the speaker’s nationality!10
(j) The meanings of many other nouns are not obviously like this: ‘door’, ‘river’, 
‘table’, ‘dog’, and ‘geek’, for example. Nonetheless, it is often the case that identifying the 
propositions speakers express using sentences that contain these nouns still requires 
identifying some additional object or property. In the right circumstances, I may use the 
sentence ‘Every chair we purchase collapses within a week’ to express the proposition 
that every chair we purchase from Smith collapses within a week of our purchasing it. 
And, as noted earlier, I may use the sentence ‘When I leave my house, I always place a 
key under the flowerpot to the right of the front door’ to express the proposition that 
when I leave my house, I place a key to my car under the flowerpot to the right of the 
front door of my house.11 
One thing is absolutely certain about the examples in (j) and some of those mentioned 
ten or so paragraphs earlier: they do not involve rule-governed indexicality of the sort 
mentioned in (e) and (f). so it would be extremely misleading for a heavy-handed 
semanticist to claim, as stanley (2002a) does, that a heavy-handed pragmatist who 
talks about pragmatic enrichment, unarticulated constituents, or utterance ellipsis in 
characterising the contributions made to the contents of the propositions we express 
is appealing to “magical” ellipsis or “magical” enrichment, if the implication in such a 
claim is that nothing equally “magical” is involved in talk of contexts assigning “salient” 
individuals, properties, sets, or functions to aphonic “indexicals” in syntax, “indexicals” 
very unlike those that have as their characters precise rules or recipes for determining 
content. The natural language expressions we use to refer to objects have utility because 
they encode constancy of object (proper names), perspective on objects (traditional 
indexicals), or satisfaction conditions on objects (definite descriptions)—or, perhaps, 
some combination (demonstrative descriptions?). by contrast, stanley’s aphonics (see 
9 As smiley (1981, 2004) observes, nouns of this form are typically the ones that russell uses to produce examples 
of definite descriptions.
10 According to some heavy-handed pragmatists, interpreting particular utterances of these words requires “satu-
ration” of an “implicit argument”. see esp. récanati (2004).
11 Here, some heavy-handed pragmatists talk of “enrichment” rather than saturation, a process that is constrained 
only by the exigencies of the overall interpretation process. For engaging overviews of the literature on saturation 
and enrichment see carston (2002) and récanati (2004).
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footnote 12) are wholly non-constant, non-perspectival, and non-descriptive in what 
they encode. In short, if they exist at all, they are expressions whose values are identified 
wholly pragmatically, without any guidance from their own meaning properties! 
Appeals by heavy-handed pragmatics to enrichment, unarticulated constituents, and 
utterance ellipsis per se are not themselves meant to constitute a theory in any interesting 
sense; they are merely (a) acknowledgments that more is going on than can possibly be 
attributed to linguistic semantics per se and (b) attempts to provide suggestive labels for 
fairly high-level and largely intuitive theoretical notions that heavy-handed pragmatists 
believe will figure prominently in any plausible theory of utterance interpretation. such 
notions, it is hoped, can be given some meat by cognitive psychology as advances are 
made in understanding the mental processes by which we integrate linguistic and non-
linguistic information in interpreting one another, processes that explain not only how 
we interpret utterances of ordinary nouns, but also how we assign references to names 
and pronouns, establish binding relations (where syntax falls short), resolve potential 
ambiguities, identify and interpret utterances replete with metaphor, irony, anacoluthon, 
aposiopesis and, on top of all of this, how we identify what a speaker is implying as 
well as saying. These cognitive processes must be appealed to by any account of what 
is going on in the examples discussed, whether it involves specifying richer phrases, 
specifying unarticulated constituents, or specifying the values assigned to aphonic 
elements in syntax in the manner of some heavy-handed semanticists. However you cut 
the cake, it’s magic, and pragmatic magic at that. It betrays a serious misunderstanding 
of the issues to complain, as stanley does, that talk of utterance ellipsis is an appeal to 
“magical ellipsis” no analogue of which is to be found in semantically heavy-handed talk 
of contexts “supplying” individuals, functions, properties, sets or whatnot to aphonic 
elements in syntax.
However we proceed, the heavy lifting is done by pragmatic inference because 
interpreting utterances of sentences containing aphonic “indexicals” is a pragmatic, richly 
inferential matter, the product of integrating linguistic and non-linguistic information. 
The only substantive difference between the way the heavy-handed pragmatist sees 
the process of identifying the proposition expressed and the way someone postulating 
aphonic elements in syntax sees it is that the latter is just insisting that the search for 
and integration of contextual information in the interpretation process is triggered 
syntactically. to the best of my knowledge, no-one has even attempted to produce an 
argument designed to show that an item in syntax is necessary for such a search to 
be triggered or for such integration to take place. (such an argument would have to 
come from empirical psychology, of course, not from armchair speculations about the 
nature of language or the nature of mind.) If it is not question-begging, then stanley’s 
(2002b) claim that “Linguistic communication is rule-governed and convention-bound 
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in a way that would be mysterious, if there were strong pragmatic effects on intuitive 
truth-conditions” is just nonsense.12 
Of course the newer global battle and continuing local battles may come together in 
interesting ways. For example, a position on the truth conditions of the proposition a 
speaker expresses with φ on a particular occasion might make more sense, and be easier 
to defend, if a heavy-handed pragmatics (or a heavy-handed semantics) is assumed; 
indeed, the position might very well incline a theorist towards one heavy hand rather 
than the other. Equally, an antecedent commitment to one heavy hand rather than the 
other might incline a semanticist towards a particular position on the truth conditions 
of the proposition a speaker expresses with φ on a particular occasion.
12 The syntactic details of the particular heavy-handed semantics stanley (2002a, 2002b) endorses are set out in 
detail by stanley and szabó (2000). Every nominal has associated with it an aphonic domain variable “assigned” a 
value “by context” and composition. We might call this a syntactic proposal with semantic import, or a semantic 
proposal implemented syntactically, it doesn’t matter. What is crucial, however, is that it has a very clear syntactic 
dimension. Although the variable is syntactically real, it is not attached to, dominated by, or associated with either 
of the quantificational nodes, D (‘the’) or NP (‘the table’), in ‘the table’ as one might have thought; rather, it ‘cohab-
its’ a node with the common noun N (‘table’). The variable is complex element they represent as f(i) a compound 
of two variables, one individual, i, the other functional, f:
(i) [DP the [NP [N 〈man, f(i)〉]]]
I take the liberty of italicizing stanley and szabo’s variables in accordance with my own policy of italicizing all 
aphonics. Here is the idea:
The value of ‘i’ is provided by context, and the value of ‘f ’ is a function provided by context that maps 
objects onto quantifier domains. The restriction on the quantified expression ‘every man’ . . . relative to 
context would then be provided by the result of applying the function that context supplies to ‘f ’ to the 
object that context supplies to ‘i’ (2000a: 251-2).
They go on:
since we are taking quantifier domains to be sets, relative to a context, what results from applying the 
value of ‘f ’ to the value of ‘i’ is a set. relative to a context, ‘f ’ is assigned a function from objects to sets. 
relative to a context, ‘i’ is assigned an object. The denotation of ‘〈man, f(i)〉’ relative to a context c is then 
the result of intersecting the set of men with the set that results from applying the value given to ‘f ’ by the 
context c to the value given to ‘i’ by c. That is (suppressing reference to a model to simplify exposition), 
where ‘[α]c denotes the denotation of α with respect to the context c, and ‘c(α)’ denotes what the context 
c assigns to the expression α:
[〈man, f(i)〉] = [man] ∩{x: x ∈ c(f)(c(i))}. (2000a: 253)
It is for expository simplicity only that stanley and szabó treat quantifier domains as sets, however. They make 
it clear that in order to deal with a certain form of counterexample, on their final theory quantifier domains are 
“intensional entities such as properties, represented as functions from worlds and times to sets.” (2000a: 252).
The problem with this proposal is that from the point of view of a theory of utterance interpretation it is, in 
fact, merely syntactic. The values “context” “assigns” to the individual variable ‘i’ and the functional variable ‘f ’ 
in any particular case are unconstrained. Neither ‘i’ nor ‘f ’ is perspectival or descriptive. (For discussion of this, 
see Neale (2007).) Thus ‘f(i)’ is wholly non-constant, non-perspectival, and non-descriptive, as well as wholly 
aphonic. since it concerns the interpretation of nominals, the theory posits n occurrences of the wholly aphonic, 
wholly non-perspectival, wholly indexical expression f(i) as part of the logical form of every sentence containing n 
common nouns. On this account, interpreting an utterance of a sentence containing n nouns involves identifying 
the values “context” has “assigned” to each of the n occurrences of ‘f(i)’ via identifying the values “context” has 
“assigned” to n occurrences of the wholly non-perspectival, non-descriptive, aphonic expression ‘i’ and n occur-
rences of the wholly non-constant, non-perspectival, non-descriptive, aphonic expression ‘f’. In effect, then, the 
proposal is nothing more than a pointlessly formal and absurdly syntactic way of saying that interpreting an ut-
terance of, say, ‘Every philosopher explained several theories to every linguist’ involves identifying which class of 
philosophers, which class of theories, and which class of linguists are being talked about. but that is precisely what 
heavy-handed pragmatics has been saying all along, only without the syntactic palaver and dogma. 
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 I shall return to heavy hands after a few words about the local battles that will concern 
me here and their repercussions for more global matters. Primarily, they concern the 
truth conditions of the propositions we express when we either (a) report speech acts 
with sentences containing verbs such as ‘say’, ‘state’, ‘assert’, ‘claim’, ‘deny’, and ‘promise’ 
(‘ralph said that that man was a spy’, ‘ralph promised to have no further contact with 
that man’, etc.) or (b) ascribe mental states with sentences containing psychological 
verbs such as ‘think’, ‘believe’, ‘know’, ‘doubt’, ‘hope’, ‘want’, and ‘intend’ (‘ralph thinks 
that that man is a spy’, ‘ralph intends to blackmail that man’). If proper names 
(‘Ortcutt’), bare demonstratives (‘him’, ‘that’) or descriptive demonstratives (‘that man’) 
are directly referential singular terms, as some philosophers maintain, then the only 
thing corresponding directly to such a term in the proposition a speaker expresses by 
uttering a sentence containing it is the term’s referent. (For purposes of continuity with 
the literature I want to examine, I shall just assume that propositions are structured 
entities containing objects and properties (including properties of properties) as 
constituents.) As direct reference theorists often put it, the term’s contribution to 
propositional content is exhausted by its reference.13 criticisms of direct reference 
usually take the form of describing a scene in which various psychological facts 
are meant to be self-evident, evaluating for truth or falsity (in connection with this 
scene) the proposition that constitutes a direct reference theory’s prediction of what 
was expressed by someone uttering a specific sentence containing a psychological or 
speech act verb, and then declaring the prediction incorrect in some way or other. I 
have yet to see an argument of this type that would worry me if I were a direct reference 
theorist; indeed every argument I know of involves either a specific type of error that 
I shall describe in a moment or else either an overestimation of the deliverances of 
compositional semantics or an underestimation of the rôle of pragmatic inference in 
explanations of psychological facts about communication. 
This leads us back to the global battle. but it is not my aim to immerse myself directly 
in the global battle here. My aim rather is to describe in some detail one of several 
traps that heavy-handed semanticists are apt to fall into—scene-reading traps, as I call 
them—and work through several important instances.14
2. Scene-reading traps
A semanticist has fallen into a scene-reading trap when he postulates a reading of some 
particular sentence S in order to explain data which, upon examination, has suggested 
itself to the semanticist because (a) a condition obtaining in a particular stipulated 
13 Well-known defenders of this view, which was brought to prominence by David kaplan, are Nathan salmon and 
scott soames, whose works are mentioned in the bibliography.
14 A fuller account of these traps is contained in Neale (forthcoming a) from which much of the present paper is 
excerpted.
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scene that he is articulating with a view to assessing for truth or falsity the proposition 
expressed by someone uttering S on a given occasion (or by a given utterance or use of 
S, as the semanticist might put it), has been erroneously built into (b) the conditions 
necessary and sufficient for the truth of that proposition.
An utterly silly example will illustrate the idea. The noun ‘bank’ is ambiguous between 
(roughly) financial and fluvial readings. This is why the sentence ‘smith is down at 
the bank’ can be used to express a proposition that is true of a scene in which smith is 
down on the bank of the river Avon fishing or to express a rather different proposition 
that is true of a scene in which smith is down at his local branch of barclays cashing 
a cheque. Now imagine a semanticist who claims to have discovered a third reading 
of ‘bank’ and describes the following scene in presenting his case: smith is cashing a 
cheque at a branch of barclays bank that is located right down on the bank of the Avon. 
(For vividness, suppose that smith often fishes in the Avon right outside this particular 
branch of barclays, and that because the queue is long he is currently leaning out of 
a conveniently open window with his line in the water.) Our imaginary semanticist 
then claims that the truth conditions of the proposition I express when I utter ‘smith is 
down at the bank’ are neither the truth conditions of the proposition we get if ‘bank’ is 
read financially nor those of the proposition we get if it is read fluvially. As he puts it, 
neither fully captures the “reading” we want—or, rather more tellingly, neither captures 
this “scene” or “scenario”—so we need a third reading of the sentence, which means we 
need a third reading of ‘bank’.
Obviously the imaginary semanticist’s argument is ridiculous, and the diagnosis of his 
error is simple. He has fallen into a scene-reading trap. The described scene, call it 
σ, is one in which the propositions expressed by both readings of ‘smith is down at 
the bank’ are true. He has fallen into the trap of building two interesting conditions 
obtaining in σ —smith’s being at a financial bank and smith’s being at a fluvial bank—
into the conditions necessary and sufficient for the truth of the proposition expressed 
by a particular reading of ‘smith is down at the bank’. but the mere existence of such a 
scene does not mean there is a reading upon which both conditions must obtain, i.e. a 
reading whose truth conditions include both of these conditions. It is quite enough that 
the propositions expressed on the two uncontroversial readings are both true in such a 
scene. (Notice two absurd consequences of the imaginary semanticist’s position: Puns 
are impossible; and every substantival word is potentially ambiguous in an indefinite 
number of ways.)
Given the evident absurdity of the ‘bank’ example, one might be excused for thinking 
that philosophers of language are not going to fall into scene-reading traps.  but one 
would be wrong. some very prominent philosophers of language have made scene-
readings errors, though they tend to involve structural rather than lexical ambiguities. 
At the end of the day, falling into a scene-reading trap is one way of making a mistake that 
can be found in discussions of truthmakers, facts, causation, knowledge, responsibility, 
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and moral luck, when a condition that obtains in a particular scene, situation, state-of-
affairs, or circumstance σ is mistakenly built into the truth conditions of a proposition 
supported by σ (in the language of barwise and Perry), verified by σ (in the language 
of russell and Ayer), or made true by σ (in language found in much traditional and 
current discussion).15 Errors of this kind are easily masked by vagaries of scope, and 
among the unfortunate consequences are philosophical doctrines marred by faulty 
logics of the (purported) connectives ‘the fact that (φ) makes it the case that (ψ)’, ‘the 
fact that (φ) makes-true the sentence (‘ψ’)’, ‘the fact that (φ) caused it to be the case that 
(ψ)’, and so on.16 
The specific scene-reading errors I shall discus here involve the propositions speakers 
express with sentences containing definite and demonstrative descriptions, by which I 
mean (more or less) noun phrases of the forms ‘the φ’ and ‘that/this φ’, respectively.17 In 
this realm, scene-reading errors lead to the postulation of scope ambiguities that simply 
do not exist (or for which there is simply no independent evidence). straightening out 
such errors should make it easier to straighten out those involving truthmakers and the 
like. but for present concerns my sights are on bad arguments for scope ambiguities, bad 
arguments against direct reference, and overestimations of what can be accomplished by 
compositional, truth-conditional semantics unaided by truth-conditional pragmatics.
I shall look at several versions of the error here, setting out the basic diagnosis with the 
help of a clear example involving definite descriptions. I shall then turn to some general 
issues about scope and binding possibilities involving demonstrative descriptions, 
before turning to more subtle and interesting scene-reading errors and general issues 
concerning scope ambiguities.
3. Scope ambiguities and definite descriptions
According to neo-russellians (i) ‘the φ’ is a quantifier phrase on a par with ‘every φ’, 
‘some φ’, ‘no φ’, ‘one φ’, ‘two φs’ etc.; (ii) there is some theoretical utility in rendering ‘the 
φ is ψ’ as [the x: φx]ψx in a metalanguage that we can use simultaneously to specify truth 
15 barwise (1981), barwise and Perry (1983), russell (1921, 1940), Ayer (1936).
16 I made a preliminary foray into this terrain in Neale (2001). The general form of the error might be called the 
truthmaker-truth condition error.
17 Following custom, I shall frequently use the quasi-English expressions ‘the φ is ψ’, ‘that φ is ψ’, etc. in lieu of the 
more inclusive formalisms ‘ψ(the φ)’, ‘ψ(that φ)’, where ψ is what remains of a sentence, however complex, after 
removing a single occurrence of ‘the φ’, ‘that φ’, etc. Prima facie, some care has to be taken with such usage because 
of the putative existence of alternative scope possibilities involving ‘the φ’, ‘that φ’ and parts of ψ. It is always dif-
ficult to decide whether to use ‘definite description’ to label a syntactic class or a semantic class. some occurrences 
of expressions of the form ‘that φ’ certainly do not function as russellian descriptions, and some occurrences of 
expressions that are not of that form certainly do (e.g. occurrences of possessives such as ‘Fred’s mother’ and some 
occurrences of zero article noun phrases, such as ‘chairman’ in ‘As chairman, I hereby declare the meeting closed’. 
I won’t be too fussy here.
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conditions and to capture certain aspects of “logical form”, the expression [the x: φx]ψx 
construed as an unabbreviated formula of a language containing the unrestricted 
quantifier the x and an unlimited class of restricted quantifiers of the form [the x: φx]; 
and (iii) no special scope conventions are needed in this language. The ambiguities in 
the following,
(1) The king of France is not bald18
(2) George thinks the author of Waverley is industrious
(3) The first man to walk on the moon might have been russian
(4) The president used to be a democrat
(5) The bride should choose 
(6) The man who drank poisoned water was inevitably poisoned
are captured using distinct sentences of our formal metalanguage, abstractly (s) (for 
‘small’) and (L) (for ‘large’):
(s) Ñ[the x: φx]ψx
(L) [the x: φx]Ñψx.
Thus (2) has the following readings:
(2s) George thinks ([the x: x authored Waverley] (x is industrious))
(2L) [the x: x authored Waverley] (George thinks (x is industrious)).
Throughout, I shall use ‘s’ and ‘L’ in this way when labelling the (alleged) readings 
of a sentence upon which a description of interest has small scope and large scope 
respectively. For simplicity, I try to avoid sentences that have readings upon which 
descriptions can be understood with intermediate scope (e.g. ‘George thinks that Henry 
doubts that the author of Waverley is industrious) and sentences containing more than 
one description.19
It is certainly a virtue of the quantificational account of descriptions that it comports 
with the existence of such ambiguities and with the fact that descriptions may contain 
variables bound by exterior quantifiers, as in (7) and (8):
18 The ambiguity russell saw in (1) may appear less certain than the others; but it is arguable that this is for largely 
pragmatic reasons. see Grice (1981) for discussion.
19 strictly speaking, even ‘The author of Waverley = the author of Ivanhoe’ may be read in two ways, as either (i) or 
(ii), but the “ambiguity” is one with no truth-conditional significance:
(i) [the x: x authored Waverley] [the y: y authored Ivanhoe] (x = y)
(ii) [the y: y authored Ivanhoe] [the x: x authored Waverley] (x = y).
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(7) Everyone talked to the person sitting opposite him
(8) The woman every true Englishman most reveres is his mother.20 
but (a) the matter of the over-generation of readings is ever present, and (b) it would 
be a serious mistake to think that there is something syntactically or semantically 
incoherent about a theory that purports to provide a non-quantificational treatment of 
descriptions comporting with such ambiguities and such binding possibilities.
4. An uncontroversial scene-reading error
When a semanticist is assessing for truth or falsity the proposition expressed by 
someone uttering a declarative sentence S with respect to a scene σ he has described, 
let us say that he is assessing a scene-sentence pair 〈σ, S〉. Of course, a single sentence S 
may be used to express quite different propositions on different occasions of use, if only 
because of the existence of indexical expressions, so any particular assessment should 
really be relativised to a particular utterance of S.
A semanticist makes a scene-reading error involving 〈σ, S〉 when he mistakenly sees 
in the truth conditions of the proposition expressed by someone uttering S on a given 
occasion, something that is only in the truth conditions of some other proposition that 
σ supports, often a proposition the semanticist himself has expressed (or implied the 
truth of) in describing σ. scene-reading errors are implicated in claims to perceive a 
reading which a sentence simply does not have. For example, people sometimes make 
scene-reading errors when they are trying to get the hang of scope ambiguities involving 
descriptions. consider (2) again
(2) George thinks the author of Waverley is industrious
which, according to the russellian, may be read as (2s) or as (2L) depending upon 
whether the description has large or small scope. A scene-reading error is made by 
a philosopher who, after appreciating the existence of the two readings, then claims 
to perceive a third that is fully captured by neither (2s) nor (2L). He describes the 
following scene: suppose (i) that George does not know who wrote Waverley; (ii) 
that George thinks that whoever it was that wrote it is industrious; and (iii) that, 
independently, George thinks that scott, whom he knows well, is industrious. The 
philosopher then says one of two things: (a) that neither (2s) nor (2L) captures this 
“reading”; or, perhaps more tellingly, (b) that neither (2s) nor (2L) captures this “scene” 
or “scenario”. Occasionally he will add that the third reading he has detected requires 
20 These examples are borrowed from Geach (1963, 1972). similar examples can be found in Mates (1973), 
Evans (1982), and May (1985). russell’s Theory of Descriptions handles these descriptions as a matter of course. 
∀xφ(iy)(ψyx) is a perfectly well-formed description for russell that unpacks perfectly well into a formula in primi-
tive notation.
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the description in (2) to have large scope and small scope simultaneously to capture this 
“reading”, “scene”, or “scenario”.
What is really going on, of course, is that the philosopher has simply described a scene 
in which (2s) and (2L) are both true. He is making essentially the same mistake as the 
imaginary semanticist described earlier who characterises a scene in which smith is 
cashing a cheque at a branch of barclays bank that is located on a bank of the river 
Avon, and claims to perceive a third reading of ‘smith is down at the bank’ that is not 
fully captured by appealing to either of the standard lexical meanings of ‘bank’. since 
the scene-reading error involving (2) was prompted by a structural ambiguity, and the 
one involving ‘bank’ by a lexical ambiguity, we might call them, respectively, structural 
and lexical versions of the error. Instances of the lexical version are no doubt rare. but 
instances of the structural version are not. Indeed, precisely the one just described has 
been made in print.21
5. A (slightly) controversial scene-reading error
The next (alleged) scene-reading error I want to mention is one that comes up 
periodically when my friend Paul Elbourne and I heap scorn on one anothers’ theories 
of definite and demonstrative descriptions. The examples here are vexing and appear to 
have divided many great minds (as well as the minds of Elbourne and me): simplifying 
somewhat, we find Geach, Neale, kaplan, russell, and salmon breaking one way, and 
Elbourne, Heim, Hintikka, and kripke breaking the other way. I shall set the stage with 
what seems to be an uncontroversial scene-reading error that has a key feature of the 
controversial one.
It is a familiar point of logic and epistemology that ignorance of the truth value of the 
proposition that p does not require ignorance of the truth value of every proposition 
entailed by p. George might not know whether scott and Ann are married to one 
another yet know that they are both married, for example. If this is the case, and if 
George wonders whether they are married to one another, I can use (9), but not (9′), to 
express a true proposition:
(9) George wonders whether scott and Ann are married to one another 
(9′) George wonders whether scott and Ann are married.22 
21 Having encountered it a good number of times in lectures and seminars, I suspected it must occur somewhere 
in the literature. In correspondence about the present article, Nathan salmon pointed me to two clear examples 
(the first of which was pointed out to him by c. Anthony Anderson): Linsky (1967, pp. 71-2) and Loar (1972, pp. 
52-55). No doubt there are others.
22 similarly, moving from attitude to speech act verbs we can describe scenes in which I can use (i) but not (i′) to 
express a true proposition:
(i) George asked whether scott and Ann were married to one another.
(i′) George asked whether scott and Ann were married.
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Just because George wonders whether the proposition that p is true, it does not mean 
that George wonders about the truth value of every proposition entailed by p. George 
may not know that scott has more than one son yet know that he has at least one. If this 
is the case, and if George wonders whether scott does have more than one son, I can 
use (10), but not (10′), to express a true proposition:
(10) George wonders whether scott has more than one son. 
(10′) George wonders whether scott has at least one son.
George might come to firmly believe there is extraterrestrial life because, and only 
because, NAsA has recently announced the discovery of (unfrozen) water and 
some type of fungus on Mars. George no longer wonders—as he did before NAsA’s 
announcement—whether there is extraterrestrial life, but he still wonders whether 
there is intelligent extraterrestrial life. That is, in this stipulated scene, call it σ, I may 
utter (11), but not (11′) to express a true proposition:
(11) George wonders whether there is intelligent extraterrestrial life 
(11′) George wonders whether there is extraterrestrial life. 
Now imagine a semanticist who first approaches (11) and (11′) with the following 
stipulated scene, σ′, in mind: George wonders about a great number of things before he 
falls asleep at night; in particular, he wonders whether there is extraterrestrial life and 
wonders whether there is intelligent extraterrestrial life. If the imaginary semanticist 
thinks the coherence of σ′ falsifies a semantic theory according to which the proposition 
I express by uttering (11) does not entail the proposition I express by uttering (11′), he 
has fallen into a scene-reading trap.23 (similar examples of the trap can be constructed 
using (9)/(9′) and (10)/(10′).) With luck, reflection on σ and the other cases mentioned 
in the previous paragraph should disabuse the imaginary semanticist.
russell seems to have seen all of this clearly when he presented the Theory of 
Descriptions, for he recognised that there are scenarios in which I may use (12), but 
not (12′), to express a true proposition (the description given small scope):
(12) George wondered whether scott was the author of Waverly
(12′) George wondered whether exactly one person authored Waverley.
certainly one can describe scenes in which George wondered whether exactly one person 
authored Waverley and use (12) to express a proposition that is true of those scenes (the 
description given small scope). but it does not follow from this that there is a reading of 
(12) whose truth requires that George wondered whether exactly one person authored 
Waverley. The semanticist who thinks otherwise has fallen into a scene-reading trap by 
23 A similar example is mentioned by kaplan (2005), involving ‘Diogenes wished to know whether there were hon-
est men’ and ‘Diogenes wished to know whether there were men.’ 
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focussing on scenes in which the propositions expressed by (12) and (12′) are both true. 
And the semanticist who claims that russell’s Theory of Descriptions predicts that the 
proposition I express by uttering (12) entails the proposition I express by uttering (12′) 
has committed errors of both logic and scholarship. At least three people whose work I 
admire greatly have made precisely this double-barrelled error in print: Elbourne (2005, 
pp. 109-112, forthcoming), Heim (1991, p. 493), and kripke (2005, p. 1023).24
6. Scope generalised
contrary to what is often claimed or assumed, scope is not a concept that applies only 
to connectives and quantifiers. In the simplest formal languages used by philosophers 
the scope of a connective or quantifier is just the smallest formula containing it. This 
definition mirrors syntactic composition and is the standard, workaday definition we 
use when explaining the languages of the propositional and predicate calculi (and 
extensions containing modal operators). It is perfectly adequate for a language in which 
the smallest non-atomic expression is a whole sentence (open or closed); but it is a 
mistake to think the workaday definition gets to the heart of the concept of scope.
reflections on the grammatical structure of natural language sentences reveal a general 
concept that spawns the workaday definition. Native speakers spot the ambiguities in 
(13) and (14) without any theoretical training:
(13) small children and pets are not permitted
(14) Health benefits are available for all men and women who are unmarried. 
24  Elbourne attributes the argument to Heim’s (1991) German paper, which I have not read. He uses example (i), 
and kripke uses example (ii):
(i) Hans wonders whether the banshee in his attic will be quiet tonight
(ii) George IV asked whether the author of Waverley was scott. 
(The use of ‘banshee’ in (i) appears to be meant to prevent the russellian from accounting for the data by giving the 
description large scope!) Elbourne (forthcoming) plans on sinking me in a new piece on this topic.
I should mention that other people whose work I admire have explicitly cautioned against making the error: Geach 
(1967), kaplan (2005), Neale (2005a), and salmon (this volume).
What is essentially a version of the same error is sometimes made in connection with examples such as the fol-
lowing (from Grice, 1989):
(iii) Give your wife flowers.
(iv) Is your wife here?
(v) Have you checked to see if the roof is leaking?
The error is made by anyone claiming that on russell’s theory someone uttering (iii) is instructing a man to ensure 
he is non-bigamously married; that someone uttering (iv) is inquiring whether the person he is addressing is non-
bigamously married; that someone uttering (v) is asking if you have checked to see if you have exactly one roof. 
One only has to consider the following sentences to see that it is an error:
(vi) Make sure you have more than one son
(vii) Have scott and Ann ever married one another?
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And armed with a smidgen of grammatical vocabulary, they will say the ambiguities 
arise because the adjective ‘small’ might apply to the word ‘children’ or to the larger 
expression ‘children and pets’ in (13); and that the modifier ‘who are unmarried’ might 
apply to the expression ‘all men and women’ or just the word ‘women’ in (14). When 
they say this, they are talking about the scope of the adjective or modifier.
Whitehead and russell introduced the concept of scope in Principia Mathematica in 
connection with the formal language they used, which was essentially the first-order 
predicate calculus with identity (though they defined identity). The definition they gave 
was basically this: 
(A) The scope of a connective or a quantifier α is the smallest sentence (open or 
closed) properly containing α.25
(Thus an expression β is within the scope of a connective or quantifier α iff β resides 
in the smallest sentence containing α.) This is general enough because the only non-
atomic expressions in the calculus are whole sentences (open or closed) and the only 
expressions whose scopes we care about are the sentence operators (∀x), (∃x), ~, •, ∨, 
⊃, and ≡.
The reasons we care about the scope of the sentence operators are semantic. They emerge 
when (a) we set out a truth definition—it matters whether a particular occurrence of a 
variable is free or bound, for example, and the binding of β by α requires β to be within 
α’s scope—and (b) when we translate between sentences of the calculus and sentences 
of natural language. Armed with the notion of scope, we have been able to shed light 
on a certain type of ambiguity found in natural language: scope ambiguity (also known 
as syntactic or structural ambiguity). In a typical case, we find a string of English with 
two meanings, one corresponding to each of a pair of sentences in the calculus that 
differ from one another in respect of the scopes of particular connectives or quantifiers. 
(‘John was fired or Jones was fired and brown was satisfied’; ‘every man loves some 
woman’.) but not all permutations of scope lead to truth-conditional ambiguity (‘every 
man danced with every woman’; ‘the king is taller than the Queen’).
In the course of becoming adept at explicating natural language scope ambiguities 
involving quantifiers and connectives, the theorist develops quite robust intuitions about 
scope that have application beyond such expressions. That is, ambiguities in natural 
language that cannot be captured using the calculus are discovered that nonetheless feel 
like ambiguities of scope. (13) above is a good example—even if one of the readings is 
more natural in the most straightforward contexts. And the theorist has the intuition 
that the ambiguity is the product of a choice between taking ‘children and animals’ 
25 In the interests of brevity, I talk of expressions rather than occurrences of expressions. The picky reader can easily 
make the relevant adjustments.
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or just ‘children’ to be within the scope of ‘small’. The theorist who also knows some 
syntactic theory might suggest the following empirical hypothesis: 
(b) The scope of an expression α is the smallest syntactic constituent properly 
containing α.
(Thus an expression β is within the scope of an expression α iff β resides in the smallest 
syntactic constituent containing α.)
We have here an empirical hypothesis about natural language whose origins are in a 
stipulation about certain artificially constructed languages, but that is no excuse for 
conflating the empirical hypothesis and the stipulation.
On this general definition of scope, the direct object of a sentence is within the scope of 
the subject, but not vice versa. In (15), for example,
(15) [s George [VP respects [scott]]]
the scope of ‘George’ is the whole sentence and so includes ‘scott’; but the scope of 
‘scott’ is just the VP (verb phrase) ‘respects scott’ and so does not include ‘George’—
‘respects’ and ‘scott’ are within each other’s scopes, but this creates no problem. Quite 
generally, then, the subject NP (noun phrase) of a sentence s is not within the scope of 
any other NP in s.
A distinction between two levels of grammatical description is required in order to 
properly see scope (thus construed) at work in quantified sentences of natural language, 
to see how, for example, superficial ambiguities of the sort we characterize abstractly 
with a pair of logical forms (s) and (L)
(s) Ñ[the x: φx]ψx
(L) [the x: φx]Ñψx
can be explained in terms of their underlying parsings. The theorist armed with a 
syntactic theory built on a chomskyan factorization of grammatical structure into LF 
(“Logical Form”) and PF (“Phonetic Form”), might put forward a fully general empirical 
hypothesis about scope: 
(c) The scope of an expression α is the smallest syntactic constituent properly 
containing α at LF.26 
(Thus an expression β is within the scope of α iff at LF β resides in the smallest syntactic 
constituent containing α.) Equivalently, for expressions α and β, if α merges with β 
26 see Neale (2005b). In the terminology of syntactic theory, β’s being within the scope of α amounts to α’s c-com-
manding β, where α c-commands β iff the first branching node (of whatever category) dominating α also domi-
nates β (and α and β are non-overlapping).
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to create [αβ], then [αβ] is both α’s scope and β’s scope. Given the empirical facts 
about natural language syntax, i.e. the facts about which categories of natural language 
expressions merge with which others to form larger expressions, there is no interpretive 
worry about α and β being in one another’s scopes. We never get a situation, for example, 
in which single occurrences of ‘and’ and ‘or’ are both found within one another’s scopes; 
or a situation, in which two noun phrases or a noun phrase and a sentence connective 
both occur within one another’s scopes.
7. Scope ambiguities and singular terms
As noted already, a strength of the Theory of Descriptions is certainly the way it 
comports with—perhaps we can say explains and predicts—intuitive ambiguities 
involving descriptions, ambiguities of scope. but it would be a mistake to think one can 
immediately dismiss theories according to which descriptions are referring expressions 
on the grounds that quantifiers admit of scope permutations whereas singular terms, 
being “essentially scopeless”, do not. As smiley (1981, 2004) rightly observes, russellian 
distinctions of scope can be mirrored using predicate abstraction. Where the neo-
russellian distinguishes (s) and (L), smiley distinguishes (s′) and (L′):
(s′) Ñψ(the φ)
(L′) (λxÑψx)(the φ).
Given the great power of lambda abstraction, this is hardly surprising—no doubt 
church was well aware he had the means to treat descriptions as singular terms and 
mirror russell’s scope distinctions.27 The distinction is still one that crucially involves 
scope, however. In (s′) the description occurs within the scope of Ñ; in (L′), by 
contrast, Ñ occurs within the scope of the description. smiley himself is prepared to 
say the difference involves the scopes of Ñ and “predicate formation” but adds that 
“there is absolutely no need to invoke a notion of scope” for the description (2004, p. 
155). Is smiley claiming (as some have) that singular terms (which for him includes 
descriptions) are the wrong sorts of expressions even to have scopes? That confused 
claim, as well as the confused claim that predicates are the wrong sorts of expressions 
to have scopes, can certainly be found in print: “People, kripke and Dummett for two, 
freely ascribe scopes to singular terms, which is incoherent since only operators have 
scopes” (Patton, 1997; 251). “Intuitively, predicates, unlike quantifier phrases, are not 
the kinds of expressions that have scope” (Graff, 2001, p. 14). but there is nothing at all 
incoherent about a singular term or a predicate (or a determiner or any other expression) 
having scope (as Dummett and kripke realise, and as smiley recognizes for predicates 
27 The power of lambda-abstraction is not always properly appreciated. It makes it possible to do all sorts of things 
in formal languages that are not necessarily exploited by natural language. This ought to make semanticists rather 
more judicious in their appeals to it when theorising about natural language.
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at least). Identifying the scope of the predicates ‘small’ and ‘who are unmarried’ in (13) 
and (14) above is vital—Are pet elephants allowed? Are married men eligible for health 
benefits? similarly for smiley’s complex singular terms ‘the φ’ in (1)-(6), which smiley 
can read as (s′) or (L′).
to claim that only operators have scopes, or to claim that predicates or singular terms 
do not have scopes, is to have a tenuous grasp of the concept of scope by virtue of 
overlooking the general geometry and its impact on semantic composition. In the 
limited syntax of the first-order predicate calculus, where the smallest non-atomic 
expression is a whole formula, the range of scopes to be considered is very limited. 
Once λx is added to the calculus this changes, of course, and a reason for caring about 
the scopes of predicates is immediately revealed, as smiley recognizes. but once the 
notion of scope is set out in its simplest way it is seen to be fully general, obviating the 
need to play a game of eternal, incremental catch-up in the face of increasingly more 
complex languages.
The point remains, however, that ambiguities of scope in natural language illustrated by 
the examples in (1) above are not readily replicated when the definite descriptions are 
replaced by proper names or bare demonstratives, and any respectable semantic theory 
must explain this fact. At the same time, we should not be too quick to jump to the 
conclusion that if we find such ambiguities with, say demonstrative descriptions ‘that φ’ 
(or ‘this φ’), that we have immediately refuted referential accounts of such expressions 
and proved that a quantificational account is required. For when the quantificationalist 
appeals to a distinction between the following (s) and (L) forms
(s) Ñ[that x: φx]ψx
(L) [that x: φx]Ñψx




8. Deictic uses of demonstrative descriptions
Depending upon whether they are being examined in connection with definite 
descriptions or in connection with the demonstrative pronouns ‘this’ and ‘that’, noun 
phrases of the forms ‘this φ’ and ‘that φ’ are known as demonstrative (as opposed to 
definite) descriptions or as complex (as opposed to simple) demonstratives. (They are 
also known as descriptive (as opposed to non-descriptive or bare) demonstratives.) I 
shall call them demonstrative descriptions; but since my discussion will be, for the 
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most part, limited to the form ‘that φ’, I shall often use ‘that φ’ as a quasi-label and talk 
of (e.g.) deictic uses of ‘that φ’.
If demonstrative descriptions are quantifier phrases rather than referring expressions 
on some of their uses, as numerous philosophers have argued or suggested, prima facie 
there is an expectation of straightforward ambiguities of scope mirroring those found 
with definite descriptions.28 Although various uses have been separated and addressed in 
the literature, the discussion of both bare and descriptive demonstratives in philosophy 
has tended (if only tacitly) to focus on demonstrative or deictic uses of such expressions, 
for example when they are used in conjunction with physical demonstrations or with 
“demonstrative intentions” involving objects in the perceptual environment or some 
recent perceptual environment. This is no doubt largely because much of the discussion 
is, in effect, responsive to, and responsive to responses to, the fascinating accounts 
proposed by russell and kaplan, who have argued that bare demonstratives, at least, 
are devices of direct reference. russell famously restricted the objects of reference to 
sense data; not so kaplan.29
Deictic uses will be my principal concern here, but a brief excursion into the realm of 
well-known non-deictic uses will be necessary if error is to be averted (English being a 
language in which there are no syntactic clues as to whether we are dealing with a deictic 
or non-deictic use). Following Evans (1982), who rejects direct reference accounts of 
both bare and descriptive demonstratives, it is common to distinguish perceptual uses 
(‘Look! That man’s got a gun!’), past-tense uses (‘That Frenchman we met in the pub 
last night spoke impeccable English’), and testimony uses (‘That mountaineer who 
keeps breaking world records is coming to town tomorrow’). I shall follow suit, but 
focus on perceptual uses which, with Evans and those he has influenced, I regard as 
paradigmatic deictic uses.30
28 see (e.g.) taylor (1980), barwise and cooper (1981), Davies (1981), Anderson and keenan (1985), keenan and 
stavi (1986), Neale (1993a, 1993b), richard (1993), king (1999, 2001), Lepore and Ludwig (2000), Dever (2002). 
(Lepore and Ludwig suggest that Davidson (1967) “may be construed as anticipating a quantificational treatment” 
(2000, p. 202). This seems to me at once an understatement and an overstatement. They also claim that their ac-
count is not quantificational. I disagree. On both matters, see Neale (forthcoming d)).
29 Not all languages are like English in using the same form for both demonstrative pronouns and demonstrative 
determiners. In French, for example, we find celui and celle as the free-standing demonstrative pronouns and ce 
and cette as demonstrative determiners. (Diessel (2003) estimates about a quarter of the world’s languages use dif-
ferent forms.) English does not always use the same form for interrogative pronouns and interrogative determin-
ers: ‘who/which man came to dinner?’
30 According to king (2001) it is “philosophical orthodoxy” that demonstrative descriptions are directly referential 
(2001, p. xi and p. 1). This is highly questionable. First, there are widely discussed, common uses of demonstrative 
descriptions that no-one regards as directly referential, in particular anaphoric and definite uses. (For discussion 
and references, see §9.) second, although a good number of philosophers may well maintain that demonstrative 
descriptions used deictically are directly referential—unfortunately, king does not tell us who is party to the alleged 
orthodoxy, he just notes that kaplan suggests extending his own directly referential account of bare demonstratives 
used deictically to descriptive demonstratives used deictically—certainly a good number of philosophers maintain 
that demonstrative descriptions used deictically are not directly referential, including Loar (1976), taylor (1980), 
barwise and cooper (1981), Davies (1982), Devitt (1984, 1989, 2003), Evans (1979, 1982), keenan and stavi 
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There is certainly a tradition of trying out quite general, quantificational “mop-up” 
accounts of demonstrative descriptions,31 but there remains broad-based and well-
motivated scepticism about the existence of scope ambiguities when such expressions 
are being used deictically, and this has dampened enthusiasm somewhat. An initial 
comparison of (1′)-(6′) with (1)-(6) certainly invites scepticism:
(1′) That prince is not bald
(2′) George thinks that that novelist is industrious
(3′) That astronaut might have been russian
(4′) That senator used to be a democrat
(5′) That bridesmaid should choose
(6′) That man who drank poisoned water was inevitably poisoned.
Unlike (1)-(6), examples (1′)-(6′) appear to have just one reading each, a reading that 
is not captured by treating the demonstrative description ‘that φ’ as a quantifier phrase 
that is assigned small scope.32
Given that ‘that φ’ or ‘that φ is ψ’ are natural answers to the question ‘which φ is ψ?’, 
it is not surprising that demonstrative and interrogative descriptions pattern together 
for numerous purposes. Like sentences (1′)-(6′), sentences (1″)-(6″) also appear to 
have a single reading each, a reading that is not captured by treating the interrogative 
description ‘which φ’ as a quantifier phrase that is assigned small scope:
(1″) Which prince is not bald?
(2″) Which novelist does George think is industrious?
(3″) Which astronaut might have been russian?
(4″) Which senator used to be a democrat?
(5″) Which bridesmaid should choose?
(6″) Which man who drank poisoned water was inevitably poisoned?
treating an expression as a referring expression is quite different from treating it as a 
quantifier phrase understood with large scope.33 but for the purposes of the narrow 
dialectic involving demonstrative descriptions in the present article, I want to put 
aside—except in one place—the important question whether the truth conditions of 
(1′)-(6′) are best explained by treating demonstrative descriptions used deictically as 
referring expressions (whether rigid or directly referential) or as quantifier phrases 
(1986), Peacocke (1982), Neale (1993a, 1993b, 1999), richard (1993), Lepore and Ludwig (2000), Dever (2002).
31 see (e.g.) taylor (1980), barwise and cooper (1981), Davies (1981), keenan and stavi (1986), Neale (1993a, 
1993b), richard (1993), king (1999, 2001), Lepore and Ludwig (2000).
32 This is one issue in the study of demonstratives where there does seem to be an orthodoxy of sorts.
33 see kripke (1977, 1980), soames (1989, 2002), and Ludlow and Neale (1991) for discussion.
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understood with large scope. This is because I want to engage constructively with king 
(2001), who holds (i) that demonstrative descriptions, used deictically or otherwise, 
are quantifier phrases, and (ii) that they are not compelled by their own semantic 
properties to be understood with large scope. so I shall simply say that when ‘that φ’ is 
used deictically in utterances of (1′)-(6′) it appears to be understood with large scope.
It doesn’t take much to upset this way of talking, of course: What is to be said when 
a sentence contains two demonstrative descriptions? Do they both have large scope? 
Formally, our answer is that, as with definite descriptions, at most one of them has 
largest scope, but both demonstrative descriptions have large scope with respect to 
the expressions of interest: verbs of propositional attitude and other non-extensional 
expressions. so, strictly speaking, the matter of whether ‘that φ’ used deictically 
may contain a pronoun functioning as a variable bound by an external quantifier—
something it could not do unless it were understood with smaller scope than the 
quantifier, of course—is not directly relevant. There is nothing semantically incoherent 
about the idea of ‘that φ’ containing a pronoun functioning as a bound variable when it 
is being used deictically, even if ‘that φ’ is treated as a referring expression, indeed even 
if it is treated as a directly referential referring expression, as salmon (2006a, 2006b) 
has clearly demonstrated; it is simply an empirical question whether natural language 
actually avails itself of this possibility.34
It should be noted that it is not just philosophers with antecedent commitments to 
referential theories that are sceptical about deictic uses of ‘that φ’ being read with 
small scope. In defending the empirical hypothesis that any natural language referring 
expression is semantically atomic in respect of its contribution to truth conditions, I 
was myself inclined towards quantificational accounts of demonstrative descriptions 
in two articles published in 1993.35 but along with those who reject such accounts 
in favour of referential accounts, I was sceptical about the existence of small scope 
readings and resigned myself to what Lepore and Ludwig (2000) rightly called an ad 
hoc scope restriction.36
34 This is a matter on which there is confusion in the literature. For a brief discussion, see footnote 55.
35 Neale (1993a, 1993b). I was exploring the empirical hypothesis that all natural language referring expressions 
are both de jure rigid and semantically unstructured (atomic), where an expression is semantically unstructured if 
and only if “its semantical value [is] exhausted by the semantical value of exactly one of its syntactical constituents” 
(1993a, p. 816). (In the truth-theoretic framework I used for exposition in some of that work, an expression’s being 
semantically unstructured amounts to the view that  “its semantical value is wholly determined by a single axiom” 
(1993a, p. 816).) The idea is explored in more detail and in new ways in Neale (forthcoming d).
36 The particular quantificational accounts I flirted with were hopeless in any case. The common suggestion was 
basically that an utterance of ‘that φ is ψ’ is to be understood as having the truth conditions of
(i) [the x: @(φx) • τ(u, x)]ψx
where @ is the actuality operator, u refers to the utterer, and τ specifies the theorist’s favoured way of targeting an 
object (for example, a demonstration or a type of intention). As stephen schiffer and scott soames pointed out to 
me almost immediately, any quantificational account that makes the speaker, the actual world, or some method of 
targeting an individual part of the proposition expressed conflicts with the very reasonable idea that the proposi-
tion I express by uttering ‘that φ is ψ’ on a given occasion is one that could be expressed or entertained by people 
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9. Non-deictic uses of demonstrative descriptions
We need to eliminate potential distractions before examining whether deictic uses of 
‘that φ’ implicate themselves in ambiguities of scope. The first distraction concerns well-
known non-deictic uses. In English, the demonstrative article precedes its nominal. but 
other languages do things differently, sometimes in ways that bear on the distinction 
between deictic and non-deictic usage. For example, in Modern Greek the demonstrative 
article (which effectively combines with a definite description rather than with a bare 
nominal to form a demonstrative description) may be pre- or postnominal:
 autos o anthropos o anthropos autos
 that     the man the man     that
 (‘that man’) (‘that man’).
And, interestingly, there appears to be a strong correlation between the prenominal 
form and deictic usage, and the post-nominal form and non-deictic usage.
ignorant of the existence of me and my utterances, intentions, and demonstrations, and by people in counterfac-
tual situations. (Not everyone is moved by this objection, but I see it as a decisive refutation of the view I was trying 
out.) In Neale (2004), I offered an alternative “Gödelian” quantificational account that avoided the schiffer-soames 
objection: an utterance of ‘that φ is ψ’ is to be understood as having the truth conditions of
(ii) [an x: φx • x=α)]ψx
where α refers directly to the object the speaker is targeting. (schiffer (2005, 2006) presents what he takes to be a 
decisive refutation of this idea. I respond in Neale (forthcoming c, forthcoming d), but I am not rash enough to 
think schiffer can ever be shaken off completely.)
It is important to see that my 2004 analysis of demonstrative descriptions used deictically is not appealing to some 
newfangled machinery to solve schiffer’s problem. The machinery itself goes back to at least 1944 and I have used 
it myself in print since 1990. I call a quantifier of the general form [DET x: φx • x = α], where DET is a determiner 
and α is a singular term (a name or a bound variable, for example) Gödelian because Gödel (1944) used definite de-
scriptions of this form in his slingshot argument against individual facts. The restricted quantifier [the x: φx • x=α] 
is the counterpart of (ιx)(φx • x=α), which is what Gödel actually uses. For discussion, see Facing Facts.
I first used Gödelian definite and indefinite descriptions in Neale (1990) to analyse items that seemed to me se-
mantically conjunctive. The appositive constructions (i) and (ii), for example, I analysed as (iii) (1990, p. 116, n. 
55):
(i) John smith, the man who threw ice cream at the pope, is ψ 
(ii) The man who threw ice cream at the pope, John smith, is ψ
(iii) [the x: man x • x threw ice cream at the pope • x=John Smith] ψx.
(It is not the English description itself that is given a Gödelian analysis in these sentences, but the combination of 
the name and the description when one of them occurs in apposition to the other.) similarly, I analysed the noun 
phrase ‘another man’ as a Gödelian indefinite description [an x: x≠α • man x], where α is a referring expression, 
perhaps a variable bound by another quantifier phrase,  as in (v), the analysis offered of (iv) (1990, p. 247):
(iv) every man who lives with another man saves money
(v) [every y: man y • [an x: x≠y • man y] y lives with x] y saves money.
(I have simplified the example here, principally by removing the donkey anaphora, which was the actual topic of 
discussion at that point in Descriptions (‘every man who lives with another man shares the bills with him’).) I ap-
pealed to Gödelian descriptions containing externally bound variables again in Neale (2004) in order to deal with 
apparently bound variable uses of descriptions. see footnote 40 of the present article. In Neale (2004) I also appeal 
to Gödelian descriptions to explain certain referential uses of definite descriptions. This idea has been criticised 
by my good friends Michael Devitt (2004, this volume) and stephen schiffer (2005, 2006), but I do not think their 
arguments succeed. For discussion, see Neale (forthcoming d)
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There is a great deal that could be said about demonstrative descriptions across 
languages, about the relationships between definite, indefinite, demonstrative, and 
interrogative descriptions, and about the relationships between all four species of 
descriptions and third-person pronouns, but I do not want to hold things up with a 
lengthy discussion here.37 suffice to say, that (i) the difference in felicity conditions 
governing the use of definite and demonstrative descriptions has yet to be articulated in 
an entirely satisfactory way, but (ii) the following observations seem to be agreed upon 
(even if they are not pulled together and presented as a batch in the literature, which 
may well be the case):38
(a) As Geach (1965, 1972), Evans (1977, 1985), Maclaren (1982), and others 
observe, demonstrative and definite descriptions are sometimes used in lieu of bound 
pronouns.39 Here are some examples involving demonstratives: 
(16) One woman whom [every tribesman]1 admires is [that tribesman]1’s wife
(17) [Every logician]1 was walking with a boy near [that logician]1’s house.
(18) [Every person you meet these days]1 seems to think it’s just a matter of time 
before Hollywood discovers how great [that person]1 is.40 
37 For some discussion, see Neale (2004, forthcoming d).
38 These observations are made in various numbers, and in various ways, by Quine (1960), Geach (1962, 1963), 
Postal (1966), Partee (1972), Mates (1973), stockwell, schacter and Partee (1973), Lakoff (1974), Evans (1977, 
1982), c. Lyons (1977, 1999), J. Lyons (1977), cooper (1979), Davies (1981, 1982), Devitt (1981a, 1981b), Ma-
claren (1982), Levinson (1983), Anderson and keenan (1985), May (1985), Hawkins (1987), kempson (1988), 
Neale (1990, 2004, 2005), Wilson (1991), comrie (1997), and king (1999, 2001). On the difference between pre- 
and post-nominal demonstrative articles in Greek, see Panagiotidis (2000).
39 It is widely believed by linguists that both personal pronouns and definite articles originate in demonstrative 
pronouns. see christophersen (1939), Givón (1984), and Diessel (1999).
40 Example (16) is from Geach (1965), (17) is from Evans (1977), and (18) is a variant of one from Maclaren 
(1982). In Geach’s (16) ‘every tribesman’ is understood with large scope to get the desired reading. In Maclaren’s 
(18) the demonstrative description appears to be used as a way of avoiding gender, an instance of a well-known 
phenomenon. (As a former student of Maclaren, I feel compelled to alert philosophers to the wealth of data about 
demonstratives in Maclaren (1982)). For examples involving definite descriptions, see (e.g.) kempson (1988) and 
Wilson (1991). It is important to see that it does not follow from the mere existence of this use of demonstrative 
(or definite) descriptions that they have to be treated semantically, on this use, as bound variables, rather than as, 
say, noun phrases that merely contain bound variables. For discussion, see Neale (2004), where I take issue with 
Wilson on precisely this matter. Wilson claims that the description ‘the fired scientist’ in (i) must be treated as a 
bound variable, hence referentially:
(i) [every scientist who was fired from the observatory at sofia]1 was consoled by 
[someone who knew [the fired scientist]1 as a youth].
but I pointed out that ‘the fired scientist’ is just an incomplete, relativised description that can be replaced by ‘the 
fired scientist in question’. In a representation of the truth conditions of an utterance of (1), a Gödelian definite 
description containing variables on both sides of the identity sign gives us exactly what we want:
(ii) [every x: scientist x . x was fired from the observatory at Sofia] 
 [the z: fired scientist z . z=x] [some y: y knew z as a youth]
 (x was consoled by y).
The matrix of [the z: fired scientist z . z=x] is understood as uniquely satisfied relative to values of x. In short, the 
russellian says that the incomplete description in (i) is not, pace Wilson, a bound variable, but just another incom-
plete description—one for which the speaker could provide a fuller description that is bound-into—a description 
containing a bound pronoun. It is an incomplete, relativized description whose natural completion contains an 
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(b) As Geach (1963, 1972), Evans (1977, 1985), cooper (1979) and others observe, 
pronouns may be linked anaphorically to quantifier phrases that do not bind them:
(19) [Just one man]1 drank rum. He1 was ill afterwards
(20) Every villager owns [just one donkey]1 and feeds it1 at night.
(21) Every villager who owns exactly one donkey feeds it at night.41
(c) As Evans (1977, 1985), cooper (1979), Davies (1981) and others observe, such 
pronouns are readily replaceable by definite descriptions, salva veritate:42
(19′) [Just one man]1 drank rum. [The man (who drank rum)]1 was ill afterwards
(20′) [Every villager]2 owns [just one donkey]1 and feeds [the donkey (he2  owns)]1 
at night
(21′) [Every villager who owns [just one donkey]1]2 feeds [the donkey (he2 owns)]1 
at night.
(d) As Geach (1963), Evans (1977, 1985), Maclaren (1982) and others observe, 
demonstrative descriptions may often be used in lieu of definite descriptions or 
unbound anaphors.43 There was one such use in the characterisation of scene-reading 
traps in the long opening sentence of the fourth paragraph of the present essay. Here 
are some more: 
(19″) [Just one man]1 drank rum. [That man]1 was ill afterwards
(20″) Every villager owns [just one donkey]1 and feeds [that donkey]1 at night
expression understood as a variable bound by the subject expression. strangely, in his brief discussion of examples 
in which descriptions appear to function as bound variables, king (2008, p. 114) appears ignorant of the literature 
on this topic—Geach (1965, 1972), Evans (1977, 1985), Maclaren (1982), Wilson (1991), Neale (2001, 2004). Per-
haps this is the reason he does not point out that he himself is presenting essentially the same Gödelian analysis I 
presented in Neale (2004), but with various added bits of machinery.
41 Examples (19)-(21) are from Evans (1977), example (21) via Geach (1963, 1972). caveat: Geach actually took 
the pronouns in these examples to be bound by the quantifiers. Evans and cooper saw clearly that this was wrong. 
The pronouns in (19) and (20) cannot be bound by their antecedents—‘just one man’ and ‘every villager’, respec-
tively—because they do not lie within their scopes; and the pronouns do not lie within their antecedents’ scopes 
because (roughly) they lie outside the smallest clause containing those antecedents, in much the same way that 
the final occurrence of x lies outside the scope of the universal quantifier in (∀x)(Fx ∧ Gx) → Hx. For those 
philosophers unimpressed by such syntactic considerations, notice that assigning ‘just one man’ and ‘a donkey’ 
large scope yields incorrect truth conditions. For a summary of the issues geared towards philosophers, see Neale 
(1990), chs 5 and 6.
42 caveat: Ultimately, Evans himself actually rejects the view that the pronouns are replaceable by definite descrip-
tions in favour of the view that they have their references fixed rigidly by those descriptions in kripke’s (1972) 
sense. One consequence of this is that on Evans’s view they resist small scope readings. (see observation (e) below.) 
This creates serious problems for his theory that other descriptivists about anaphora do not face.
Notice that sometimes it is essential to use a description instead of the pronoun in order to disambiguate. compare 
the following:
(i) I bought an apple. I gave it to Jane.
(ii) ? I bought an apple and a banana. I gave it to Jane.
43 caveat: Geach treats such anaphors are “pronouns of laziness”. For criticism, see Evans. 
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(21″) Every villager who owns [exactly one donkey]1 feeds [that donkey]1 at night.
(22) [One and only one person authored Waverley]1 and [that person]1 is scotch.
(23) One thing that counts as the personal property of [a tribesman]1 is [[that 
tribesman]1’s] wife.
(24) Every team has [one player who is weaker than the others]1. [That player]1 is 
the one to play hardest against.
(25) You may think the time has come to silence our friend in Moscow; but of 
course I could not endorse [that course of action].44
(e) As Geach (1967, 1972), Davies (1981), and others note, pronouns and 
demonstrative descriptions that are replaceable by definite descriptions may be read 
with small scope if the corresponding description can be read with small scope:
(26) someone murdered Mrs smith last night. There is conclusive evidence that 
it was a man, and although the police have no suspect, they believe they will 
discover his (/that man’s/the man who murdered smith’s) identity within 
hours.
(27) Hob thinks a witch has put a curse on him. He also thinks that she (/that 
witch/the witch who has put a curse on him) has put a curse on Nob.
(f) As Geach (1963, 1972), Mates (1973), Evans (1977, 1985), and others observe, 
definite descriptions may contain—and anaphoric pronouns and demonstrative 
descriptions that are replaceable by definite descriptions may be understood as if they 
contained—pronouns bound by external noun phrases. We have already seen this:
44 Example (22) is due to Ayer (1936), (23) to Geach (1965, 1972), and (24) to Maclaren (1982). Example (25) is 
one I have added to highlight a use of a demonstrative description that might be treated as anaphoric or anadeictic 
depending upon one’s views about Davidsonian event variables. I raised the issue briefly in Neale (1990) pp. 262-3 
n 48. Ayer presents (22) as an informal, natural language statement of the analysis russell’s Theory of Descriptions 
provides for:
(i) The author of Waverley is scotch.
Ayer’s informal statement is used frequently in the literature, though Ayer (1946) himself came to prefer Moore’s 
(1944) three-clause statement because he accepted stebbing’s (1936) point that if ‘that person’ (or at least ‘that’) is 
being used deictically in (22), then (22) is not equivalent to russell’s analysis of (i), and that if it is being used as 
a device of cross-reference (anaphorically, as we would now say), then the second conjunct of (22) alone is just a 
restatement of (i), still unanalysed. (stebbing appears to be suggesting that on the cross-referential use, ‘that per-
son’ is equivalent to ‘the one and only person who authored Waverley’ or to ‘the person in question’.) Ayer did not 
have the machinery to articulate unbound anaphora clearly—indeed, although anaphoric uses of both definite and 
demonstrative descriptions have been acknowledged in the philosophy literature for decades, it was probably not 
until Evans’s work that philosophers had any inkling of what sort of machinery would be required to get anything 
like a clear statement of the type of anaphora exemplified in Ayer’s informal statement of russell’s analysis. 
Geach comes close to seeing that whereas in (16) ‘every tribesman’ is understood with large scope to get the desired 
reading and ‘that tribesman’s wife’—more particularly ‘that tribesman’—is understood (on the reading in ques-
tion) as within its scope, in (23) ‘that tribesman’ is not understood (on the reading in question) as within the scope 
of ‘a tribesman’. The contrast between (16) and (23) is brought out nicely by Evans (1977) as an important part of 
a powerful polemic against Geach’s theories of pronominal anaphora.
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(20) [Every villager]2 owns [just one donkey]1 and feeds [the donkey (he2  owns)]1 
at night.
(20′) [Every villager]2 owns [just one donkey]1 and feeds [that donkey]1 at night.
(20″) [Every villager]2 owns [just one donkey]1 and feeds [it]1 at night.
(g) There are interesting semantic and distributional differences between personal 
pronominal, definite, indefinite, demonstrative and interrogative anaphors (and 
anadeictics) that appear to be bound up with particular issues about uniqueness and the 
more general issue of quantifier phrase incompleteness.45 For present purposes, it suffices 
to note one important difference between ‘the φ’ and ‘that φ’  that bears on their uses as 
anaphors: the unique satisfaction of φ, or of some readily inferable elaboration of φ, is 
part and parcel of the semantics of ‘the φ’ but not part of the semantics of ‘that φ’. This is 
one reason demonstrative descriptions are often thought to be demonstrative versions 
of indefinite descriptions.46 Another is the seeming truth-conditional equivalence of 
(e.g.) ‘I’ve read that book’ and ‘That’s a book I’ve read.’ There are pragmatic reasons for 
choosing one over the other, but truth conditions are unaffected. but they are used as 
definite rather than indefinite anaphors, as we have seen, functioning as abbreviated 
definite descriptions.47 In effect, ‘that φ’ is often a useful way of avoiding the question 
of how ‘the φ’ should be “completed” when the unadorned φ is satisfied by more than 
one thing, while still, in certain cases, drawing attention to the fact that not any old φ 
will do. It is as if ‘that φ’ is understood as ‘the φ in question’, relieving the speaker of the 
immediate burden of expanding upon φ when it is satisfied by more than one thing. 
This explains certain subtle contrasts in the use of ‘the φ’ and ‘that φ’, such as the one 
between (26) and (26′), adapted from an example used by king (2001):
(28) Imagine a unique place on Earth where gravity is only half as strong as it is 
here. I could do slam dunks in that place.
(28′) ? Imagine a place where gravity is only half as strong as it is here. I could do 
slam dunks in the place.48
45 see Neale (2004, forthcoming d).
46 Again, see Neale (2004, forthcoming d). 
47 Indefinite anaphora is typically effected with the word ‘one’:
(i) Hob bought an old brown donkey and Nob also bought one.
(ii) Hob bought an old brown Greek donkey then a young one
(iii) Hob bought an old brown donkey then an old grey one.
In (i), ‘one’ is understood as ‘an old brown donkey’; in (ii), it is understood as ‘brown donkey’; and in (iii), it is 
understood as ‘donkey’. A unitary N′ theory straightforwardly explains both examples (unless the DP hypothesis 
is correct). see Neale (1989).
48 Not everyone finds the contrast sharp because there is actually a colloquial use of ‘the’ upon which (20′) is fine. I 
have modified king’s example mostly to circumvent its strangeness and a controversial claim involving lack of ana-
phora that king makes. (king imagines being one of two people who have “together and silently (to eliminate the 
possibility of anaphoric connection) performed calculations that show that there is exactly one location (we don’t 
know where) on the earth where its gravitational field is weak.” (2001, p. 68-69). recognising the implications, 
king utters ‘Even I could slam dunk at that place’. substituting ‘the place’ for ‘that place’, he says, fails to preserve 
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Filling out the description or tacking on ‘in question’ removes the relevant contrast:
(28″) ? Imagine a unique place on Earth where gravity is only half as strong as it is 
here. I could do slam dunks in the place in question / the place where gravity 
is only half as strong as it is here.49
(h) Not all non-deictic uses of demonstrative descriptions are anaphoric. First, as 
Evans (1982) notes, there are uses of ‘this φ’ in some dialects upon which it may be used 
in lieu of an indefinite description:
(29) I met this interesting artist in the pub last night. 
Evans makes it clear that he has in mind a specific (rather than a referential) use of the 
indefinite: some particular individual furnishes the speaker’s grounds for his utterance, 
and ‘this’ can be used in some dialects to indicate this.50 second, it is a familiar point of 
grammar that demonstrative descriptions, both singular and plural, are often used in 
lieu of non-anaphoric definites:51
felicity. Even if this is not technically anaphora, it is certainly anadeixis.)
49 king (2001) uses pairs such as (28) and (28′) to show that demonstrative descriptions in such examples are not 
just stylistic variants of definite descriptions. In a more recent paper, king (2008) argues the case again, largely 
in response to salmon’s (2006a, 2006b) claim that some demonstrative descriptions that are bound-into are, or 
appear to be, “stylistically altered definite descriptions”. Here is what king says in response to salmon, using an 
example he had used in his book (2001, p. 75):
[s]uppose that when a race car driver wins a certain (large) number of races, he is inducted into 
the prestigious checkered Flag club. We are watching the end of a race on tV in which the 
winning driver has, in virtue of this very win, achieved that mark. The announcer screams, “And 
by winning this race, Mario qualifies for induction in the checkered Flag club.” Intending to 
convey how important the checkered Flag club is to race car drivers, I say nodding at the tV:
(6) [Every race car driver in the checkered Flag club]1 still remembers that race he1 won.
Obviously, this is perfectly fine. but replacing the complex demonstrative with the comparable 
definite description results in infelicity:
(6′)  * [Every race car driver in the checkered Flag club]1 still remembers the race he1 won.
. . . if the complex demonstrative in (6) is really a “stylistically altered definite description,” as 
salmon claims, it is utterly mysterious why substituting the appropriate description [my empha-
sis, srN] for the complex demonstrative would lead to infelicity. After all, salmon’s claim is that 
the complex demonstrative is the definite description in such a case. (2008, p. 113).
Assuming king is right about the infelicity of (6′), he establishes here at most that ‘that φ’ does not function felici-
tously as a stylistic variant of the particular definite description ‘the φ’, but not the more general conclusion that it 
does not function felicitously as a stylistic variant of a definite description. so even if king has a good case against 
salmon on this issue—of course, much depends upon how narrowly salmon construes the phrase “stylistically 
altered definite descriptions”—he has no case against the suggestion I made above that sometimes demonstrative 
descriptions are used to relieve the speaker of the immediate burden of filling out the unadorned φ, when φ is 
satisfied by more than one thing.
50 I am here using ‘specific’ in the sense of Ludlow and Neale (1991, 2005). I am simplifying greatly. For one thing, 
we need to bring in pseudo-specific uses of ‘this φ’ that are common in joke telling (‘so this bald guy walks into a 
bar with a frog on his head, and the barman says “Where did you get that?”...’).
51 Examples similar to these are given by Evans (1982) and king (2001), though doubtless the uses they exemplify 
have been mentioned earlier. king (2001) calls the understood use of (31) a “no demonstration, no speaker refer-
ence” use.
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(30) Do you remember that house we were going to build?
(31) If I ever find that person who turned in my wallet, I’ll send him a reward.
In (30) and (31), the demonstrative descriptions seem to be understood as if they were 
definite descriptions.52 As far as (30) is concerned, the reason seems to emerge when 
we contrast (30) with the past-tense use of ‘that architect’ in (32), or when we create a 
single question as in (33):
(32) Do you remember that mad architect we met and were going to hire?
(33) How good is your memory? Do you remember that mad architect we met and 
were going to hire and that house we were going to build?
In using (33), it is vital (assuming the house was never built) to defeat the existence 
implication that would arise if the demonstrative description were understood with 
large scope. Evidently, what we do is construe it as having the semantics of a definite 
description with small scope. And if the addressee has no memory of either, natural 
replies to (33) would involve incomplete definite descriptions that could be readily 
completed in context. Uses of demonstratives upon which they are no more than 
stylistic variants of definite descriptions are legion, and little more needs saying about 
them. Problems such uses raise about non-existence are reduced to familiar (though 
not completely solved) problems involving uses of definite descriptions.
10. Demonstratives, binding, and scope
As already noted, definite descriptions may contain variables bound by exterior 
quantifiers. can demonstrative descriptions contain such variables? An interesting 
example of a non-deictic use of a demonstrative description I mentioned in “term 
Limits” was one that Jamie tappenden brought up in conversation one afternoon:
(34) Every man eagerly awaits that day when he retires.
The interesting feature of this example is that on the interpretation tappenden intended 
the pronoun ‘he’ must be bound by the exterior quantifier phrase ‘every man’, within 
whose scope it (and the demonstrative description as a whole) lie. Again, this looks like 
a straightforward example of a demonstrative description used in lieu of, or interpreted 
as, a definite description (“certainly an analysis that makes ‘that day when he retires’ 
52 The indefinite, specific use appears to be restricted to ‘this φ’. Definite uses involving ‘this φ’ are easy to find. An 
interrogator, after repeated demands for a particular piece of information, warns his prisoner, 
(i) I shall get this information from you, one way or the other.
Here are two more cases involving the distal, adapted from Quirk et al (1985), one involving a plural:
(ii) Would those passengers seated in rows 20 to 30 now please board the  aircraft.
(iii) Would that passenger seated in 34c please come to the podium.
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equivalent to ‘the day (when) he retires’ looks plausible here” (1993c: 120, n 39).) On 
a non-deictic use of this sort, then, ‘that φ’ is a quantifier phrase by virtue of being 
understood as equivalent to a russellian definite description; and this captures the 
fact that such cases do not appear to involve reference—tappenden fastened onto 
the future-directed sentence (34) in our discussion precisely to stress the absence of 
genuine reference.53
Notoriously, quantifying into demonstrative descriptions used deictically is an ugly 
business. In “term Limits” I contrasted the following:
(35) [Every driver]1 knows the mechanic working for him1
(35′) ? [Every driver]1 knows that mechanic working for him1
certainly (35′) is very strained indeed when ‘that mechanic working for him’ is used 
deictically. There does not seem to be anything semantically incoherent going on here, 
for there is nothing incoherent about a scene in which I utter (35′) while using four 
fingers, two from each hand let us suppose, to demonstrate each of four mechanics, 
each one of whom works for exactly one of the four drivers in question. It would be easy 
enough to work out what I as trying to communicate; yet (35′) does not naturally lend 
itself to this use for some reason. 
two explanations suggest themselves once we separate a couple of things we have 
harmlessly coalesced until this point: understanding ‘that φ’ used deictically as a 
referring expression and understanding it as a quantifier phrase that insists on large 
scope. Obviously, if it is a quantifier phrase that (for some reason) insists on larger 
scope than ‘every driver’, then we would have an explanation of the strained nature 
of (35′). but we would have an equally good explanation if (a) ‘that φ’ is a referring 
expression, and (b) there is a prohibition (for some reason) on referring expressions 
properly containing variables bound by exterior quantifiers—for example, because all 
natural language referring expressions are semantically atomic.54 This is not a matter 
to be decided by fiat. The idea of referring expressions, even directly referential ones, 
having semantically relevant structure and containing variables bound by external 
quantifiers is perfectly coherent, syntactically and semantically. The interesting question 
53 similar examples are discussed by king (2001) and Dever (2002). The latter suggests that binding into ‘this φ’ is 
more problematic than binding into ‘that φ’, contrasting examples similar to the following:
(i) Every man dreads that moment when his eldest child leaves home.
(ii) ? Every man dreads this moment when his eldest child leaves home.
Interestingly, it appears easier to bind into ‘this φ’ when the binding is only “implicit”. The day arrives when Dever’s 
eldest child leaves home. I happen to be staying with him in Austin that day. He says to me over breakfast, ‘I’ve 
been dreading this moment.’ I reply with (iii):
(iii) It’s only natural—every man dreads this moment.
Perhaps this is something like a semanticist’s pun, the implicit nature of the binding allowing me to play against 
one another readings that are similar to “strict” and “sloppy” readings in the linguists’ sense. see Neale (2005b) 
for discussion.
54 On this notion, see footnote 36.
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is the empirical one I confronted in “term Limits”: is the possibility of semantically 
structured referring expressions actually exploited in natural language? (And if not, why 
not?) The question is on a par with another interesting empirical question I confronted 
in the same article. Obviously there is nothing semantically incoherent about the idea of 
non-rigid referring expressions; but is the possibility of non-rigid referring expressions 
actually exploited in natural language? (And if not, why not?)55
55 With salmon (2002, 2006a, 2006b), stanley (2002b), and others, I read king (2001) as claiming, with Lepore and 
Ludwig (2000), that the idea of directly referential singular terms containing variables bound by exterior quantifi-
ers is unworkable, indeed semantically incoherent. As stanley observes “king takes the existence of QI [‘Quantify-
ing In’] cases to provide a decisive refutation of the thesis that complex demonstratives are referring expressions” 
(2002b, p. 607). And stanley himself claims that within a general semantic framework of structured propositions 
the idea of directly referential singular terms containing variables bound by exterior quantifiers must fail: “the 
data provide a “damning class of cases for the direct reference account”; and “Given the framework assumed, it is 
fairly straightforward [my emphasis, sN] to show that if any of this data is taken at face-value, the direct reference 
account of complex demonstratives is false” (2002b, p. 607). It is not surprising that stanley does not demonstrate 
just how “straightforward” it is to show that the direct reference account of demonstrative descriptions is falsified 
by king’s QI data, taken at face-value: salmon (2006a, 2006b) has shown that it is, in fact, a straightforward techni-
cal exercise to provide the allegedly unworkable direct reference account within a general semantic framework of 
structured propositions.
The idea of referring expressions—directly referential or otherwise—containing variables bound by exterior quan-
tifiers is no more problematic, syntactically or semantically, than the idea of bound variables themselves being 
referring expressions; or the idea of sentences containing variables bound by exterior quantifiers. (Direct reference 
adds no special wrinkle since the variable is itself the paradigm of the directly referential expression.) The relevant 
facts ought to be clear from the fact that the occurrences of the open sentences Fx and Gx in ∃x(Fx ∧ Gx) do not 
undermine the technical ideas behind the compressed claims that (i) individuals are the extensions of singular 
terms, (ii) truth-values are the extensions of sentences, or (iii) functions from n-tuples of truth values to truth val-
ues are the extensions of n-place sentence connectives. (There are several well-known methods of decompressing 
so as to bring open sentences into the fold. For discussion, see Evans (1977) and, for more detail, the Postscript to 
the (forthcoming) expanded edition of Facing Facts, where these issues come up in connection with defining the 
extensions of open sentences and defining extensional operators and extensional languages.)
remarks in king’s (2008) reply to salmon (2006a, 2006b) suggest his position, today at least, is not that bind-
ing into directly referential singular terms is incoherent after all, even within a general semantic framework of 
structured propositions! so it would seem king, now at least, sides with salmon against Lepore and Ludwig and 
against stanley on the relevant technical issue. king (2008) focuses on what he claims are empirical shortcomings 
of salmon’s direct reference semantics. In effect, king (2008) shifts the grounds, or at least the emphasis, of the 
debate from a conceptual issue to an empirical one about coverage. but given that salmon is well aware of different 
uses of demonstrative descriptions and never claimed to be giving a “mop-up” semantics for all uses, the particular 
empirical issue is one with little bite.
salmon (2002, 2006a, 2006b) mistakenly groups me with king, stanley, Lepore and Ludwig in connection with 
semantic incoherence claims here. In particular, he construes (a) my mention in Neale (1990) of the particular 
troubles I saw bound-into definite descriptions creating for strawson’s (1950, 1954) presuppositional accounts of 
descriptions and Hornstein’s (1987) type II quantifier account—type II quantifiers always have large scope—and 
(b) my empirical hypothesis in Neale (1993b) that natural language referring expressions are all rigid and semanti-
cally atomic as suggesting that I take the possibility of binding into definite descriptions as demonstrating that it 
is semantically incoherent to treat descriptions as referring expressions. but I do not. (a) In connection with the 
discussion in Neale (1990), salmon has misconstrued me as making a fully general claim about theories of descrip-
tions rather than one specific to the theories of strawson and Hornstein—as far as Strawson is concerned, my claim 
may well be false, as Paul Elbourne has shown me. (b) In connection with the discussion in Neale (1993b) salmon 
has simply misinterpreted my empirical hypothesis (that natural language actually fails to exploit the possibility 
of non-atomic singular terms) for an in-principle, technical claim, susceptible of formal proof, the truth of which 
(if it were true) would constitute a knock-down argument against treating bound-into demonstrative descriptions 
as referring expressions and hence against treating them as directly referential referring expressions. For detailed 
discussion, see Neale (forthcoming d).
stanley (2002b) does something similar when he asserts that “The first paper I know of that clearly recognizes the 
threat QI cases pose for the direct reference account of complex demonstratives is stephen Neale’s 1993” (2002, 
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In “colouring and composition”, I gave examples which suggested it was not binding 
per se that was the problem: 
(36) keith1 likes that guitar he1 is playing
(36′) [That/this guitarist]1 likes that guitar he1 is playing.
(36″) [The guitarist]1 likes that guitar he1 is playing. 56
These seem fine even when ‘that guitar he is playing’ is being used deictically. What 
differentiates these examples from (35′) is that semantically singular noun phrases are 
binding ‘he’, which means there is no relativisation of guitar to guitar player. The real 
issue, I suggested, is relativity rather than binding, an idea I have taken up elsewhere.57
It is clear there is much work to be done on non-deictic uses of demonstrative 
descriptions. Although the data are well-known, and although we seem to have a 
reasonably good handle on most of it, I think it is fair to say that the pieces have not 
been brought together as comprehensively and cogently as they should have been in 
the literature. A useful start has been made by king (2001), but he attempts a semantic 
unification that seems strained precisely because it attempts to foist ambiguities of scope 
onto us even for deictic uses of ‘that φ’. This is because king is attempting to provide 
a unitary quantificational treatment of demonstrative descriptions that is meant to 
cover both those used deictically and those used non-deictically. This seems to me like 
a serious mistake because demonstrative usage very clearly precludes demonstrative 
descriptions being understood with small scope, just as common wisdom has it in the 
(largely, but not wholly, referentialist) literature. As we shall now see, king’s principal 
example of ‘that φ’ used deictically being understood with small scope is unconvincing 
for a host of reasons.
p. 607). First, no-one can “clearly recognize” the threat stanley mentions, since there is no such threat, as salmon 
(2006a, 2006b) has shown. second, I did not even mention in the paper stanley cites (Neale (1993b))—nor had 
I mentioned anywhere else for that matter—the possibility of binding into demonstratives posing any threat to 
direct reference. The examples I brought up of attempted quantification into demonstrative descriptions—viz. (34) 
and (35′) above, both of which stanley alludes to—were not brought up to raise conceptual or technical trouble 
for (or pose a conceptual or technical “threat” to) direct reference accounts; they were brought up in the course of 
defending the empirical hypothesis that natural language does not avail itself of the perfectly coherent possibility of 
referring expressions that are semantically non-atomic. stanley has misinterpreted an empirical hypothesis for an 
in-principle, technical claim. For further discussion, see Neale (forthcoming d). 
56 In (36)—and depending upon how things turn out, in (36′)—I am assuming something that I and many other 
semanticists find uncontroversial: referring expressions may bind pronouns in exactly the same way that quantifier 
phrases may. see Neale (2006) for discussion.
57 In Neale (2004, 2005, 2007). Of course, there is still a trivial form of relativisation when we switch players as in
(i) This guitarist [pointing] likes that guitar [pointing] he is playing, unlike that one   
[pointing] who does not like that guitar [pointing] he is playing.
Following up on note 53, notice that (ii)-(iv) are fine if uttered by the guitar player himself (or by someone other 
than the player stroking the guitar while the player is playing it):
(ii) keith likes this guitar he is playing
(iii) That/this guitarist likes this guitar he is playing
(iv) The guitarist likes this guitar he is playing.
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11. Demonstratives, attitudes, and scope 
king (2001) attempts to show the superiority of a particular quantificational account of 
demonstrative descriptions over referential accounts.58 My interest here is restricted to 
what I believe to be the only argument he presents that really engages with the issue I 
want to address: whether demonstrative descriptions used deictically can be understood 
with small scope in attitude reports.59 
It is king’s view that sentences of the general form ‘A thinks (believes, doubts, hopes, 
etc.) that that φ is ψ’ are ambiguous in respect of the scope of ‘that φ’, even when ‘that 
φ’ is being used deictically. The existence of such a scope ambiguity is not at all obvious 
in connection with a deictic use of ‘that man’ in (37): 
(37) John thinks that that man is French
This sentence appears to have no reading upon which the demonstrative description has 
small scope. but, says king, the existence of small scope readings for demonstratives 
can be brought out by examining uses of sentences containing demonstratives with 
richer descriptive matrices. 
before looking at the scene-sentence pair that king articulates in order to make his 
argument, it will pay to look at a similar scene-sentence pair lacking certain features of 
king’s. For purposes of constructive engagement, I shall continue to assume, with king, 
that propositions are structured entities containing objects and properties (including 
properties of properties) as constituents, so there will be frequent talk of propositions 
containing persons and the contents of their thoughts as constituents, where the latter 
are themselves given in terms of propositions that may contain further persons and the 
contents of their thoughts as constituents.
First, the scene, τ: (For the sake of continuity, I shall use king’s characters.) During 
drinks before a company dinner, an up-and-coming but unpleasant executive manager 
named Alan is the only person in a group of company executives at the bar who is 
wearing a yellow tie. sherry, who sits on the company’s board of directors, wrote 
an internal memorandum to Alan last week saying she held him responsible for a 
production error that may cost the firm a substantial amount of money. sherry has 
since learned that Alan is angry at her because of this memo, that he now hates her, that 
he is known to be vindictive, that he still enjoys the support of several board members 
58 king takes himself to be challenging and refuting the “philosophical orthodoxy” that demonstrative descriptions 
are directly referential in kaplan’s (1989) sense (2001, p. xi and p. 1). As I mentioned earlier, I seriously doubt the 
existence of such an orthodoxy. 
59 The problems with king’s argument—which is actually a version of an argument originally given by Loar 
(1972)—actually generalise to his arguments for small scope readings in other non-extensional contexts, but a 
much longer article dealing with issues of existence, necessity, and rigidity would be required to spell out why in 
the sort of detail that would satisfy me enough for publication.
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(including the cEO), and that he appears to be making good on his claim to fix the 
production problem in a way that might well end up saving the firm money. sherry is 
looking over at the group of men at the bar, who are now laughing and joking. You and 
I are watching sherry. I know the aforementioned history, but you do not, and I know 
you do not. You notice that sherry, who is watching the executives at the bar, looks 
apprehensive and you ask me if I know why. I am not sure whether you know Alan by 
name, so I reply by uttering (38) while pointing at Alan:
(38)  sherry thinks that that guy wearing a yellow tie [pointing at Alan] hates her.
Our scene-utterance pair is 〈τ, 38〉. And if (38) is ambiguous in respect of scope, the 
relevant scene-reading pairs are 〈τ, 38L〉 and 〈τ, 38s〉. but there is no temptation to think 
we need to read (38) as (38s) here, i.e. no temptation to think we need to understand 
the demonstrative description ‘that guy in the yellow tie’ with small scope in order to 
make sense of the adequacy of my response to your question. The (uncontroversial) 
reading upon which it is understood with large scope, (38L), is just fine. I did not 
express a proposition that entails the proposition that sherry thinks Alan is wearing 
a yellow tie. Nor did I, by using ‘that guy wearing a yellow tie’, pragmatically imply the 
proposition that sherry thinks Alan is wearing a yellow tie. (Alan’s tie, although visible 
from where we are, does not have to be visible from where sherry is for my utterance 
to be felicitous—indeed, it is felicitous even if I know that sherry is colour-blind and 
know she has no second-hand information about the colour of Alan’s tie.) so let us say 
that since I neither expressed nor pragmatically implied the proposition that sherry 
thinks Alan is wearing a yellow tie, I did not intend to communicate (or convey) that 
proposition.60 Of course, I used ‘that guy wearing a yellow tie’ for a reason: because I 
thought it would make it clear to you whom I meant; but the property expressed by the 
matrix ‘guy wearing a yellow tie’ is no part of the content of the thought sherry has in 
the proposition I expressed, (i.e. it is no part of the content of a contained proposition 
that sherry stands in the thinking or believing relation to). bear this in mind as we turn 
now to king’s scene-sentence pair.
The sentence king asks us to consider is this:
(39)  sherry thinks that that guy who was just named cEO [pointing at Alan] hates 
her.
king claims that (39) is ambiguous between the (uncontroversial) reading upon which 
the demonstrative description is assigned large scope, (39L), and a reading upon which 
it is assigned small scope, (39s).61
60 As Grice might have put it, since I neither said nor conversationally implicated that sherry thinks Alan is wearing 
a yellow tie, it was no part of what I meant that sherry thinks Alan is wearing a yellow tie.
61 king says, “. . . of course we have a scope ambiguity” in (39) (2001, p. 111). to forestall possible confusion, some-
thing I mentioned earlier must be kept in mind: when king says that (39) has a reading upon which the demon-
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The scene king articulates in order to argue for the existence of (39s) is the following, 
which I shall call σ and harmlessly embroider to ward off uninteresting objections to 
king’s argument and to provide continuity with τ: shortly after the company dinner, 
the high-flying Alan joined the board of the company. A year later, relations between 
sherry and Alan are still bad, and sherry still thinks that Alan hates her. Fortunately, 
sherry and Alan manage to stay out of one another’s business most of the time. They 
behave cordially towards one another in public, and overall sherry is very happy with 
her job. This afternoon there was a heated board meeting during which the cEO 
resigned and Alan was appointed his immediate successor by a slim majority. tonight 
at the company’s christmas party, there is to be a speech by the outgoing cEO followed 
by a speech by Alan. some but not all of those at the party know that Alan has been 
named cEO. sherry is one of those who knows—she is still on the board and voted 
against him at this afternoon’s meeting. she is convinced that Alan will be vindictive 
in his new position, making her work life miserable. she is moping around at the party 
saying she is thinking of quitting her job. You ask me why sherry is behaving like this. 
I reply by uttering (39), while pointing at Alan, and by doing so, I am successful (let us 
suppose) in communicating an explanation (or a reason) for sherry’s behaviour.
If we call this scene σ, then we can talk about the scene-utterance pair 〈σ, 39〉 and the 
scene-reading pairs 〈σ, 39L〉 and 〈σ, 39s〉. 
There are several facts about 〈σ, 39〉 that need to be explained. I want to proceed slowly. 
It is uncontroversial that we need explanations of the following facts:
A: The proposition I expressed (what I said) by uttering (39) while pointing at 
Alan was true.
B:  by expressing whatever (true) proposition it was that I expressed by uttering 
(39), I provided a satisfactory response to your question about sherry’s 
behaviour because I communicated (in some way or other) the proposition 
that sherry’s behaviour is to be explained by her belief that Alan has just been 
named cEO and hates her (a proposition that is, in fact, true).
(For immediate purposes, I am skirting around issues that might be raised about a 
potential cognitive difference between the belief that A φ-ed and ψ-ed and the pair 
consisting of the belief that A φ-ed and the belief that A ψ-ed. to the best of my 
knowledge, nothing turns on this here.)  B is worded carefully to avoid begging an 
important question that will come up later. It does not follow from A and B that 
strative description is assigned large scope, (39L), he is harmlessly sloughing over the important distinction, as I 
am, between (a) the view that the demonstrative description is understood with large scope and (b) the view that 
it is a rigid referring expression. The assimilation is harmless in the present context because the only thing king is 
trying to prove the existence of is (39s), a reading upon which the demonstrative description has small scope. The 
only thing, that is, that is relevantly sub judice is (39s). see king (2001), p. 192, n. 20. For ease of exposition and 
engagement, I follow king in this.
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the (true) proposition I expressed is identical to the (true) proposition about the 
explanation for sherry’s behaviour that I communicated. For it is perfectly consistent 
with the truth of A and B that I pragmatically implied the latter. Indeed, the status of 
this proposition is something we shall have to take up as it is might be thought arguable 
that something more specific than fact B needs to be explained, something we could 
describe by replacing “I communicated (in some way or other)” by “I expressed”. call 
the result of making that change *B. (If *B is explained, then obviously B is explained 
because expressing the proposition that p would count as a way of communicating the 
proposition that p, assuming, as is the case in our example, successful communication.) 
but *B is not uncontroversial and will have to be examined carefully. For the moment, 
then, let us proceed with caution, sticking to the less specific, uncontroversial fact B. 
two distinct, mutually exclusive arguments for the existence of (39s) can be attributed 
to king depending upon whether he is claiming merely that A and B need to be 
explained or claiming that A and *B (and thereby B) need to be explained. For purposes 
of exposition and engagement I shall suppose them put forward by two distinct people, 
whom I shall call ′king (bar king) and *king (star king). since there is no plausible 
third argument distinct from those of ′king and *king that King could be giving, 
either king is ′king, or king is *king.62 I can state my conclusions immediately: both 
arguments for reading (39) as (39s) fail. (39L) is the only reading of (39), and it forms 
part of the explanation not only of facts A and B but of another important fact, C, that 
certainly needs to be explained.
12. First formulation of the argument for a small scope reading
It is ′king’s contention that explaining the pair of facts A and B requires an appeal 
to (39s), i.e. requires understanding the demonstrative description ‘that guy who was 
just named cEO’ with small scope in (39). remember, sherry thought Alan hated her 
before she learned that he had been named cEO, so the mere fact that she thinks Alan 
hates her does not, by itself, explain her current behaviour, though it certainly forms 
part of the explanation. but so does the fact that she thinks Alan has just been named 
cEO. As king notes, if I had uttered (40) or (41) I would not have communicated an 
explanation for sherry’s behaviour, despite expressing a true proposition:
(40) sherry believes that Alan hates her
(41) sherry believes that he [pointing at Alan] hates her.63
62 For textual complexities that bear on whether king is ′king or *king, see the next two footnotes.
63 Here is what king himself says: “For it to seem true, it must be a correct explanation of sherry’s behavior, and 
not merely be a true ascription of belief. . . .” (2001, p. 112). but what do the occurrences of ‘it’ refer to here? My 
utterance of (39)? That is what the passage I quote in the next footnote strongly suggests. to keep things as clean as 
possible, I shall predicate truth (falsity) of propositions only and construe any talk of the truth (falsity) of an utter-
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so the fact that I managed to communicate an explanation for sherry’s behaviour must 
have something to do with the fact that I used the demonstrative description ‘that guy 
who was just named cEO’ and not ‘he’ or ‘Alan’.
′king purports to explain what that something is. If (39) is read as (39L), the proposition 
I expressed does not have the (complex) property expressed by the matrix ‘guy who was 
just named cEO’ as part of the content of the thought sherry has. (The proposition’s 
truth is certainly consistent with sherry having an additional thought whose content 
is that, say, the guy who was just named cEO hates her, but that is not the issue.) And 
this, ′king claims, means that reading (39) as (39L) fails to explain why my utterance 
constitutes a satisfactory response to your question. In short, it is ′king’s contention 
that even if reading (39) as (39L) explains fact A, it does not explain fact B. by contrast, 
says ′king, reading (39) as (39s) gives us what we want: the proposition I expressed 
by uttering (39) has the (complex) property expressed by the matrix ‘guy who was 
just named cEO’ as part of the content of the thought sherry has for it is (roughly) 
the complex proposition that sherry thinks that Alan has just been named cEO and 
hates her. And this, says ′king, explains why my uttering (39) constitutes a satisfactory 
response to your question: I expressed a proposition that contains the explanation for 
sherry’s behaviour: her belief that Alan has just been elected cEO and hates her—when 
I uttered (39).64
ance as shorthand for talk of the truth (falsity) of the propositions the speakers are expressing by producing those 
utterances. On this use, the opening sentence of the passage just quoted would be rendered as “For it to seem that 
I expressed a true proposition, that proposition must not only be true, it must contain an explanation for sherry’s 
behaviour.” but if that is the right way to read king he is claiming that *B needs to be explained, not just B, so he 
must have in mind *king’s argument for (39s), not ′king’s. see below.
64  Here are king’s own words (I have numbered his sentences in bold font for purposes of the analysis that fol-
lows):
(1) It seems to me that [39] is not read as [39L] in the present case. (2) For I think we have the intuition 
that my utterance of [39] explains Sherry’s behavior [my emphasis, srN]. (3) but if [39] is read as [39L], it 
wouldn’t explain her behavior [My emphasis, srN.] (4) For it [my emphasis, srN] only ascribes to sherry 
the belief that Alan hates her. (5) but sherry has believed that for some time, and that she has this belief 
does not explain her behavior. (6) Intuitively, I [my emphasis, srN] have explained sherry’s behavior 
because part of the content of the belief I [my emphasis, srN] ascribe to her is that Alan was just named 
cEO. (7) [39L] fails to capture this (2001, p. 111).
In sentence (2), it seems king is claiming (a) that my utterance of [39] communicates the explanation of sherry’s 
behaviour (or that I do by producing that utterance). In sentence (3), he seems to be claiming that it (my utter-
ance of (39)) would not communicate an explanation of sherry’s behaviour if [39] were read as [39L]. That is, 
the pronoun ‘it’ in king’s sentence (3) appears to be anaphoric on ‘my utterance of [39]’ in sentence (2) (and not 
upon ‘[39]’, for example, in sentence (3)). If this is right, then king appears to be assuming (correctly) that it is not 
sentence (39) itself or even a reading of sentence (39) that communicates the explanation of sherry’s behaviour, 
but my utterance of (39) on a particular reading, which commonsense would certainly prefer. but then notice the 
occurrence of ‘it’ in sentence (4). Is it anaphoric on ‘my utterance of [39]’ in sentence (2)? Or on ‘[39L]’ in sentence 
(3)? If it is anaphoric on ‘my utterance of [39]’ in sentence (2), which stylistic considerations might favour, king 
would have to be using sentence (4) as a whole to say that my utterance of (39) only ascribes to sherry the belief 
that Alan hates her. but, of course, he does not hold this, though he might well hold that if [39] were read as [39L], 
my utterance of (39) would only ascribe to sherry the belief that Alan hates her. but if the occurrence of ‘it’ in sen-
tence (4) is anaphoric on ‘[39L]’ in sentence (3), then king would have to be using sentence (4) to say that (39L) 
itself ascribes to sherry the belief that Alan hates her. In sentence (6), however, it is I rather than my utterance of 
(39) which explains sherry’s behaviour, and it is I who ascribe to her the belief that Alan was just named cEO. so 
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There are at least three problems the sceptic about (39s) now wants to raise for ′king’s 
argument as it stands. The first can be solved easily by taking on one or another of 
several non-trivial commitments. The second can be overcome only by denying certain 
data and accepting the ramifications. The third is that all of the relevant facts are already 
explained without postulating (39s) as a reading of (39), a fact that simply undercuts 
the original motivation.
13. The missing piece problem: ellipsis or inference?
The first problem is interesting not because it cannot be solved—there are three obvious 
solutions—but because articulating it clearly brings out the fact that any solution has 
non-trivial commitments.
If (39s) is a genuine reading of (39), and if my response to your question is read as 
(38s), then the (complex) property expressed by the matrix ‘guy who was just named 
cEO’ is part of the content of the thought sherry has in the proposition I expressed. 
But this fact alone cannot constitute an explanation of fact B. Let’s proceed slowly and 
carefully. suppose you had posed your question to me as follows:
(42) Why is sherry behaving like that?
Given your question, it is clear that I intended to communicate to you, by uttering (39), 
an explanation for sherry’s behaviour. reading (39) as (39s) would certainly provide an 
immediate explanation of fact B if the proposition I expressed when (39) is read as (39s) 
entails the proposition that Sherry’s behaviour is to be explained by her belief that Alan 
has just been named CEO and hates her. but unless there is considerably more to the 
proposition I expressed than meets the eye when (39) is read as (39s), the proposition 
I expressed manifestly does not entail the aforementioned proposition about sherry’s 
behaviour because it entails no proposition whatsoever about Sherry’s behavior. However, 
given the question you asked me, by uttering (39), certainly I intended to communicate 
to you—I intended you to construe me as giving you—an explanation (or reason) for 
sherry’s behaviour. but if (39) is read as (39s), as ′king claims, then although I expressed 
a proposition that contains sherry having a certain thought—standing in the thinking 
or belief relation to a certain proposition—which itself has as part of its content the 
property expressed by the matrix ‘guy who was just named cEO’, and although, as a 
good, cooperative Gricean, I intended to be communicating to you in some way or 
other the proposition that sherry’s behaviour is to be explained by her belief that Alan 
king appears to be using sentence (6) to say something that is consistent with my expressing the proposition that 
sherry believes Alan was just named cEO or with my merely pragmatically implying that proposition. The inter-
pretive complexities of this passage and the complexities involved in reconciling a favoured interpretation with an 
interpretation of the quotation in the previous footnote are two of the reasons I have chosen to reconstruct king’s 
argument as two distinct arguments, given by ′king and *king. As I have said already, there is no plausible third 
argument distinct from those of ′king and *king that King could be giving.
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has just been named cEO and hates her, I did not, on ′king’s account, as it currently 
stands, actually express that proposition. The point is simple: whether (39) is read as 
(39L) or (39s), the proposition I expressed by uttering (39) is not the proposition that 
sherry’s behaviour is to be explained by her belief that Alan has just been named cEO 
and hates her.65
In short, the claim that (39) is read as (39s) in 〈σ, 39〉 can provide only part of an 
explanation of fact B, and ′king needs additional machinery to finish the job. (so does 
the sceptic about (39s), who claims (39) is read as (39L), of course.) There appear to 
be three simple solutions to the Missing Piece Problem available to ′king. As I said, it 
is not the problem itself that is of most interest but the chosen solution, each of which 
carries its own commitments.
(i) The Pragmatic Implication Solution. For familiar reasons, when considering 
the proposition or propositions an utterer U intends to be communicating on a given 
occasion by uttering a sentence S, we need to distinguish the proposition that U 
expresses on that occasion by uttering S from any propositions that U pragmatically 
implies by expressing whatever proposition he expresses (by uttering S) on that 
occasion. There are well-known problems involved in drawing this distinction cleanly, 
but its existence can hardly be denied in the light of the work of Paul Grice and the 
legions of philosophers and linguists who, inspired by this work, have attempted to 
distinguish what U said and what U only conversationally implicated, or to improve 
upon Grice’s way of carving things up.66 A major problem here, of course, is explaining 
in any theoretically satisfying way just why any particular proposition that seems to be 
communicated is pragmatically implied (if it is). Ex post facto justifications for labeling 
particular propositions that are communicated propositions implied rather than 
expressed are easy to come by, as Grice and others have shown, and if the pessimists like 
chomsky, Davidson, and Fodor are right, providing a satisfactory account of pragmatic 
implications may well require nothing short of a complete theory of mind, as it is sure 
to involve at least inference, beliefs, expectations, memory, perception and norms, not 
to mention knowledge of language.
65 This is why I would not have contradicted myself had I uttered (39) as part of (i):
(i) sherry thinks that that guy who was just named cEO hates her. some people have suggested that her 
belief that Alan has just been named cEO and hates her explains her behavior. but they’re wrong: 
sherry’s belief that Alan has just been named cEO and hates her does not explain her behavior: her 
belief that he’s in love with her does.
I might have committed a moral error if I had uttered (i), but I would not have committed a logical or semantic one. 
There might seem to be an obvious reply ′king could make in connection with (i): Had I uttered (i) instead of just 
(39), the first sentence would have been read as (39L), and this explains why I would not have contradicted myself. 
but this is actually besides the point: by ′king’s own lights, I would not have contradicted myself had I explicitly 
insisted that the first sentence be read with the semantics king assigns to (39s). This would be an odd thing to do, 
of course, but that is not relevant to the small point I am making right now: whether read as (39L) or (39s), the 
proposition I expressed by uttering (39) is not actually a proposition about sherry’s behavior.
66 see, in particular, sperber and Wilson (1986).
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Nonetheless, ′king has as much right as anyone else to appeal to such a distinction in 
clear and uncontroversial cases and to consider judicious appeals in those that are less 
clear or more controversial. No-one would berate ′king or anyone else for being alive 
to the distinction, and armed with it he seems to have a perfectly good explanation of 
fact B. All he has to say is that although the proposition I expressed by uttering (39) was 
just the simple one traceable to reading (39) as (39s), by expressing that proposition in 
this particular context (i.e. in reply to your question), I pragmatically implied another 
proposition: the proposition that sherry’s behaviour is to be explained by her belief 
that Alan has just been named cEO and hates her. Why? because I am a co-operative 
Gricean and take you to be one too. You asked me for an explanation of sherry’s 
behaviour. I expressed whatever proposition ′king’s semantics says I expressed when 
I uttered (39) read as (39s). but in addition I communicated to you the proposition 
that sherry’s behaviour is to be explained by her belief that Alan has just been named 
cEO and hates her. How? (a) by expressing a proposition in which sherry has a belief 
whose content includes Alan’s having both the relational property of hating sherry 
and whatever property it is that ′king’s theory of demonstrative descriptions says is 
expressed by ‘guy who was just named cEO’ when it occurs as a syntactic sister to the 
demonstrative article ‘that’; and (b) by pragmatically implying that sherry’s behaviour is 
to be explained by her having  that particular belief.
but perhaps ′king would not find the Pragmatic Implication solution attractive. Perhaps 
he would want the proposition I expressed by uttering (39) to be the proposition that 
sherry’s behaviour is to be explained by her belief that Alan has just been named cEO 
and hates her. If so, then ′king must choose one of two ellipsis-based solutions to the 
Missing Piece Problem, one syntactic, the other pragmatic.
(ii) The Heavy-handed Semantic Solution (Syntactic Ellipsis and LF). According 
to this solution, in 〈σ, 39〉 the sentence I uttered was one whose LF representation is 
more complex than its superficial form, (39), indicates; and this LF is recoverable in 
accordance with general principles of syntactic ellipsis studied by generative linguists.67 
Let us continue with the supposition that the sentence you used to ask me about sherry’s 
behaviour was (42):
(42) Why is sherry behaving like that?
In the context, I provided a perfectly satisfactory response by uttering (39). but suppose 
I had begun with the word ‘because’ and answered using (39′):
(39′)  because sherry thinks that that guy who was just named cEO [pointing at 
Alan] hates her.68
67 typically, syntactic ellipsis (or deletion as it is often known) results from the deletion of an expression under 
stringent conditions of ‘identity’ that guarantee its ‘recoverability.’ However, there are plenty of unresolved issues 
here, for example whether identity is to be construed as a formal or interpretive notion. None of this matters for 
present concerns. see Neale (2004).
68 It sounds more colloquial with ‘she’ replacing ‘sherry’, but let that pass.
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Or suppose I had mirrored your question by answering with (39″):
(39″) sherry is behaving like that because she thinks that that guy who was just 
named cEO [pointing at Alan] hates her.
If I had uttered (39″), clearly I would have expressed a complex proposition about 
sherry’s thinking, about her behaviour, and about a particular relation between them 
(signalled by my use of the word ‘because’). so if (a) my utterance of (39)—or, for that 
matter, my utterance of (39′), had I uttered that instead—is actually an utterance of a 
sentence whose LF is identical to the LF of (39″), and if (b) (39″) is read as (39″s), i.e. 
if the occurrence of the demonstrative description ‘that guy who was just named cEO’ 
in the occurrence of the sentence ‘sherry thinks that that guy who was just named 
cEO hates her’ on the right hand side of ‘because’ in (39″) has small scope in that sub-
sentence, then not only is the (complex) property expressed by the matrix ‘guy who 
was just named cEO’ part of the content of the thought sherry has in the proposition 
I expressed by uttering (39), so is sherry’s behaviour and the relation between her 
thinking and her behaviour, expressed by the word ‘because’. to the extent that ′king 
is happy with the syntactic Ellipsis solution, he now has an immediate explanation of 
fact B. but bear in mind, on this account the sentence I uttered, viz. (39), has an LF 
identical to the LF of (39″) and so is not actually being read as (39s) but as (39″s), an 
(alleged) reading upon which the demonstrative description has small scope in the 
smaller sentence containing it. so, in fact ′king’s argument will not have demonstrated 
the existence of (39s) but, at most, the existence of (39″s).
There is another ellipsis-based solution, ′king might consider, however:
(iii) The Heavy-handed Pragmatic Solution (Utterance Ellipsis, Underdetermination, 
Unarticulated Constituents). Not every form of ellipsis is syntactic in nature.69 
Following the lead of Quine (1940), sellars (1954), and many others who have tried to 
understand the phenomenon of incomplete definite descriptions, ′king might appeal 
to a pragmatic or speech act notion of ellipsis, utterance ellipsis, a notion that has no 
syntactic dimension.70 On this approach, my utterance of (39) was not the utterance 
of a sentence whose logical form is identical to the logical form of (39″). rather, my 
utterance was elliptical for a more “explicit” utterance I could have produced, for example 
an utterance of (39″), and as such should be interpreted as if it were an utterance of 
(39″).71 The idea here is that since you and I are both operating in accordance with the 
usual Gricean principles, I expect you to interpret my utterance of (39) as if it were 
69 For a discussion, see Neale (2004).
70 see Neale (1990) ch. 3 and (2004).
71 In the literature on incomplete descriptions (and other quantifier phrases), the pragmatic ellipsis approach is 
usually called the explicit approach, the idea being that the speaker could have produced an utterance of a sentence 
that makes more explicit the proposition he is seeking to express, for example ‘the mayor of boston is bald’ instead 
of ‘the mayor is bald.’ For discussion, see Neale (2004, 2007).
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an utterance of (39″), and you recognize this. In the less committal language of Dan 
sperber and Deirdre Wilson (1986), the proposition I expressed by uttering (39) is 
underdetermined by the syntactic and semantic facts, it contains elements that do not 
correspond to elements in the syntactic structure of the sentence. In the language of 
John Perry (1986), the proposition I expressed by uttering (39) contains a number 
of unarticulated constituents.  (I do not mean to be suggesting that utterance ellipsis, 
underdetermination, and unarticulated constituent analyses are always equivalent. but 
they are similar enough for present purposes.) to the extent that ′king is happy with 
utterance ellipsis or unarticulated constituents of propositions expressed, he now has 
an immediate explanation of fact B. but again, bear in mind that ′king’s argument will 
not have demonstrated the existence of (39s) but, at most, the existence of (39″s).
I do not know which of (i)-(iii) ′king should endorse, but he must endorse one of them 
to solve the Missing Piece Problem if reading (39) as (39s) is to provide part of an 
explanation of fact B.
14. The missing entailment problem 
The second problem for ′king is more serious. There appears to be a third fact about 〈σ, 
39〉 that needs to be explained: 
C: If the proposition I expressed by uttering (39) while pointing at Alan is true 
(fact A), then so is the proposition that Alan was just named cEO.
The possibility of rejecting C is something we can certainly explore.72 but let us suppose 
for the moment that ′king agrees that C needs to be explained and points out that 
anyone rejecting C is committed to the implausible view that I could have uttered (43) 
without inconsistency:
(43) ? sherry thinks that that guy who was just named cEO [pointing at Alan] 
hates her, but that guy [pointing at Alan] wasn’t just named cEO.
to someone who thinks C needs to be explained, I would be no more consistent uttering 
(43) than I would be uttering (44):
72 This is a place where the difference between treating demonstrative descriptions as expressions that insist on 
large scope and treating them as expressions of direct reference is important. However, it would be wrong to 
claim that the direct reference theorist about demonstrative descriptions must reject C. Perhaps there are direct 
reference theorists who reject C, but such a rejection is not a consequence of direct reference per se, for the direct 
reference theorist could maintain that, strictly speaking, no proposition is expressed if the intended referent does 
not satisfy the descriptive matrix. Indeed, this is not an uncommon position. Multiple proposition theories such as 
those sketched by Neale (1999) and Dever (2002) may provide other ways of capturing C. On Dever’s account it is 
actually captured because the proposition that Alan was just named cEO is a separate proposition expressed.
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(44) ?That guy who was just named cEO [pointing at Alan] wasn’t just named 
cEO.
If (39) is read as (39L) in connection with my response to your question, we have a 
straightforward explanation of fact C: the proposition I expressed straightforwardly 
entails the proposition that Alan has just been named cEO. but if (39) is read as (39s), 
the proposition I expressed does not entail the proposition that Alan was just named 
cEO. so reading (39) as (39s) fails (on its own) to explain C. so not only does ′king 
need to appeal to one of the pieces of machinery offered in the previous section to 
explain fact B, he is going to need additional machinery in order to explain fact C.
but the search for suitable machinery should be called off immediately. The problem 
is not simply that an appeal to (39s) does not, by itself, provide an account of fact C. 
It is that failing to provide an entailment-based explanation means the theory makes 
some straightforwardly false predictions in minimally different cases. consider a 
counterfactual scene σ′ that differs from σ in just this respect: Alan has not just been 
named cEO but sherry and I think he has. ′king’s theory predicts that the proposition 
I express by uttering (39) while using the demonstrative description deictically and 
pointing at Alan is true! This is a patently unacceptable result as I have precisely the 
same communicative intentions in σ and σ′, and I have provided a satisfactory response 
to your question because I communicate the same explanation of Sherry’s behaviour using 
exactly the same sentence! Obviously ′king cannot coherently argue that his theory does 
not make this counterintuitive prediction because (i) as far as 〈σ, 39〉 is concerned, (39) 
must be read as (39s) rather than as (39L) in order to explain fact B, yet (ii) as far as 〈σ′, 
39〉 is concerned, the mere fact that Sherry and I were wrong in thinking that Alan had 
been named CEO means (a) that (39) must be read as (39L), and (b) that reading it as 
(39L) does explain the fact that I communicated the explanation for sherry’s behaviour! 
In short, ′king’s original  motivation for (39s) has gone up in smoke. Any resuscitation 
of his position will have to involve rejecting the view that C needs to be explained. 
so, the present state of play seems to be as follows:
 (1) There is no question that (39L), the (uncontroversial) reading of (39) upon 
which the demonstrative has large scope, explains facts A and C. The problem (as ′king 
sees it) is that fact B is left unexplained when (39) is read as (39L). 
 (2) by contrast, there is no question that ′king’s (sub judice) reading (39s) explains 
fact A and, in conjunction with any of the three pieces of additional machinery offered 
in §13, also explains fact B. The problem is that fact C is left unexplained when (39) is 
read as (39s).
so, superficially at least, we seem to have a double failure on our hands, two readings of 
(39) that fall equally short of providing complete explanations of the relevant facts.
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but now suppose ′king says he was too quick in accepting C: the third fact to be 
explained is not C but *C:
*C: Although the proposition I expressed by uttering (39) while using the 
demonstrative description deictically and pointing at Alan, does not entail 
the proposition that Alan was just named cEO, in performing that act I 
pragmatically implied the proposition that Alan was just named cEO.
by retreating from C to *C, ′king is now claiming that the Missing Entailment Problem 
is spurious: the sceptic’s argument assumes that the proposition that Alan was just 
named cEO is entailed by the proposition I expressed by uttering (39); but in fact, 
says ′king now, the proposition that Alan was just named cEO is merely one I implied 
pragmatically.
so what we have on our hands now is a down and dirty fight about the semantics-
pragmatics distinction, or rather about the distinction between propositions expressed 
and propositions pragmatically implied. Let us put this on hold for a moment, 
summarise ′king’s position, and turn to the third problem the sceptic raises for ′king.
′king now maintains that the facts to be explained are A, B, and C*. In order to 
explain B, he must appeal to one of the three solutions to the Missing Piece Problem: 
(1) Pragmatic Implication; (2) Heavy-handed semantics (syntactic Ellipsis and LF); or 
(3) Heavy-handed Pragmatics (Underdetermination, Utterance Ellipsis, Unarticulated 
constituents). And in order to explain C* he must appeal to the idea that I pragmatically 
implied the proposition that Alan was just named cEO.
15. The pre-existing, uncontroversial explanation problem
The third problem is that ′king’s argument never really had a chance of demonstrating 
the existence of the controversial reading (39s) in the first place. There are two related 
reasons for this. The first is that neither scope nor my use of a sentence containing 
an attitude verb are doing any of the heavy-lifting in σ. In response to your question, 
I could have communicated to you the proposition that sherry’s behaviour is to be 
explained by her belief that Alan has just been named cEO and hates her using the 
simple sentence (39†) instead of (39):
(39†) Alan has just been named cEO and he hates her.
Furthermore, as Josh Dever has pointed out to me, assuming you and I both know 
that sherry thinks Alan hates her, I could even communicate it to you by uttering just 
(39‡):
(39‡) Alan has just been named cEO.
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The viability of (39†) and (39‡) as responses to your question that seem just as good 
as (39), suggests very strongly that talk of scope is a red herring in any explanation of 
fact B. (Unless ′king argues for the implausible position that (39†) and (39‡) are the 
products of syntactic ellipsis, their LFs identical to the LF of (39), perhaps even (39″)!) 
Quite general facts about σ, about human psychology, and about communication are 
surely where the real action is. And if these facts can explain how it is that I could have 
communicated to you the proposition that sherry’s behaviour is to be explained by her 
belief that Alan has just been named cEO and hates her in 〈σ, 39†〉 or 〈σ, 39‡〉, it would 
be quite extraordinary if they could not explain how I did it in 〈σ, 39〉! ′king seems to 
have fallen into a scene-reading trap: he has simply assumed from the outset that no 
plausible explanation of the relevant facts is forthcoming if (39) is understood on its 
uncontroversial reading (39L), and so must be read as (39s), when in fact just such an 
explanation must be forthcoming because of the viability of utterances of (39†) and 
(39‡) as replies to your question.73
A perfectly acceptable explanation of the relevant facts emerges uncontroversially once 
we compare 〈σ, 39〉 with the earlier example, 〈τ, 38〉, in which I uttered (38), read as 
(38L):
(38)  sherry thinks that that guy wearing a yellow tie [pointing at Alan] hates her
In τ, I used the demonstrative description ‘that guy who is wearing the yellow tie’ solely 
because I thought it was a good one to get you to fasten upon the right person. I neither 
expressed nor pragmatically implied the proposition that sherry thinks Alan is wearing 
a yellow tie. so, in particular, the proposition I expressed by uttering (38) does not have 
the property expressed by the matrix ‘guy wearing a yellow tie’ as part of the content of 
the thought sherry has. In 〈σ, 39〉, the sceptic says that (39) is read as (39L) and that the 
proposition I expressed does not have the property expressed by the matrix ‘guy who 
was just named cEO’ as part of the content of the thought sherry has. but—and this 
is the difference—the sceptic claims that σ has certain features which make it the case 
that I nonetheless pragmatically implied the proposition that sherry’s behaviour is to be 
explained by her belief that Alan has just been named cEO and hates her.
Among the shared assumptions in σ before I uttered (39) were the fact that sherry works 
for the company, and the fact that whoever is named cEO of the company is going to 
be sherry’s (and everybody else’s) boss. σ might still be fleshed out in different ways 
depending upon such things as my assumptions about your state of mind, in particular 
73 I am assuming, of course, that ′king is allowing king’s text to speak for him—see, in particular, sentences (2) 
and (3) of the passage I quoted earlier in footnote 65—′king cannot sincerely or coherently claim that he never 
intended to show that no plausible explanation of the relevant facts is forthcoming if (39) is understood on its un-
controversial reading as (39L), merely that a plausible explanation is (also) available if it is understood on the sub 
judice reading (39s), which makes it unclear that (39s) fails to exist. recall king is trying to demonstrate, or at least 
motivate, the existence of the sub judice reading, and if there is already a perfectly good explanation of the relevant 
facts that does not appeal to the sub judice reading, then the motivation evaporates.
122
EUJAP  Vol. 3  No. 2  2007
whether I assume you already know that sherry thinks Alan hates her, assume you don’t 
know this, or assume neither; and whether I assume you already know Alan has just 
been named cEO, assume you don’t know this, or assume neither. since nothing that 
importantly separates ′king from the sceptic emerges from comparing the various ways 
of spelling out σ in respect of these assumptions—trust me, I have worked through the 
permutations in detail—let’s just stipulate that in σ, before I speak I assume you already 
know that sherry thinks Alan hates her, and that I do not assume that you know Alan 
has just been named cEO. (These assumptions seem to be ones that king builds in, but 
if not it doesn’t matter.)
You and I are good Griceans, of course: You asked me your question because you wanted 
to know why sherry is behaving as she is, and I take you thus. (Nothing that importantly 
separates ′king from the sceptic alters if you already know the answer and are merely 
trying to find out whether I knew about the bad blood between sherry and Alan, for 
example.) I am being cooperative when I respond to your question with (39), and you 
take me to be so. More precisely, I intend my conversational contribution to be true, 
informative, and relevant. You assume, correctly, that my response is a genuine attempt to 
communicate to you an answer. (For standard Gricean reasons, there is no presumption 
that the proposition I express must exhaust the propositions I communicate.) Assuming, 
as the sceptic does, that (39) is read as (39L), I have expressed a proposition that is true 
only if Alan was just named cEO and sherry thinks Alan hates her. I could have used 
‘Alan’ or ‘he’ [pointing at Alan] or ‘that guy’ [pointing at Alan] or ‘that guy wearing the 
yellow tie’ [pointing at Alan] if all I wanted to do was refer to Alan. but I didn’t. I used 
‘that guy who was just named cEO’. Why? because I intended you, the hearer, to realise 
that Alan’s having just been named cEO is information relevant to finding out the 
answer to your question about sherry’s behaviour. since (a) agents’ beliefs play crucial 
rôles in their behaviour, (b) I have already expressed the proposition that sherry believes 
Alan hates her in response to your question, and (c) that proposition was something 
already assumed to be true, the most natural and plausible thing for you to conclude 
here is that I am pragmatically implying the proposition that sherry believes Alan has 
just been named cEO and ultimately communicating that the belief sherry has in the 
proposition I expressed and the belief she has in the proposition I pragmatically implied 
conspire to explain her behaviour. Thus, a perfectly natural account of fact B that does 
not require the postulation of the controversial (39s) as a reading of (39).
Notice that there is no commitment in this explanation of fact B to the idea that 
whenever I use a sentence of the general form ‘A thinks (believes, doubts, etc.) that 
that φ is ψ‘ the descriptive matrix φ plays precisely this role. The only commitment is 
to the idea that the speaker is using the particular noun phrase he is for a reason and 
sometimes intends the hearer to recognise this and assign that information a rôle in 
identifying a proposition he is pragmatically implying. In τ, I used ‘that guy in the 
yellow tie’ merely to steer you to the right individual. In σ, I used ‘that guy who has just 
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been named cEO’ not only to steer you to the right individual but also to communicate 
to you the proposition that sherry thinks Alan has just been named cEO and thereby 
lead you to realize I am trying to communicate to you the proposition that sherry’s 
behaviour is to be explained by her belief that Alan hates her and her belief that he has 
just been named cEO.
so there is a perfectly good explanation of why my utterance is meant to explain 
sherry’s current behaviour that does not appeal to (39s) and the controversial thesis 
that demonstrative descriptions used deictically may have small scope with respect to 
attitude verbs.
It would seem that ′king fell into a scene-reading trap. Not the simplest kind—he is 
not inferring the existence of the sub judice reading (39s) solely on the grounds that 
reading (39) as (39s) in σ is needed to explain A, when A is, in fact, already explained 
when (39) receives its (uncontroversial) reading (39L).74 The scene-reading trap ′king 
falls into is inferring the existence of the sub judice reading (39s) on the grounds that 
reading (39) as (39s) in σ is needed to explain A and B together, when in fact both 
are already perfectly well explained when (39) receives its (uncontroversial) reading 
(39L). For notice that (a) the scene, σ, is one in which, as ′king acknowledges,75 the 
uncontroversial reading of (39L) is true, but (b) σ is described in such a way that ′king’s 
alleged reading [39s] would also be true, if it were a genuine reading. In effect, certain 
features of σ that figured in the original description lured ′king into thinking that there 
is a reading of (39) upon which the demonstrative description has small scope, and that 
this reading is needed to explain the truth and explanatory force of my reply to your 
question. but, in fact, reading (39) as (39s) is neither necessary nor (without one of the 
three pieces of additional machinery offered in §11) even sufficient to explain fact B. 
Furthermore, reading (39) as (39s) means fact C is completely out of reach and forces 
king to show that it is C* not C that needs to be explained.
74 Indeed king himself seems to warn against precisely that error in a footnote:
(1) . . . it should be clear that as long as Alan . . . was named cEO. . . if [38s] is true, so is [39L] . . . . (2) 
since if the narrow scope readings are true in such cases, so are the wide scope readings, we cannot simply 
appeal to the fact that the ascriptions seem true to defend the claim that there are narrow scope readings 
in these cases. (3) For an opponent could claim that the intuition about truth in such a case arises from 
the wide scope reading (or a reading that is equivalent, or nearly equivalent to the wide scope read-
ing—e.g. a reading arising because the ‘that’ phrase is claimed to be directly referential). (4) since appeal 
to simple intuitions about truth of ascriptions wouldn’t supply us with evidence of narrow scope readings 
in these cases, we have had to, e.g., consider whether [39] in the described situation explains sherry’s 
behavior…(2001, p. 193 n. 23).
In effect, king is here pointing out that his postulation of (39s) is based on its explanation of the pair of facts, A 
and B. In sentence (4), I suspect king means ‘[39]’ to be understood as ‘my utterance of [39]’. see the discussion 
in footnotes 63 and 64 above. 
75 see previous footnote.
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The sceptic’s current position, then, is that the existence of (39s) is not justified because 
(i) the facts in need of explanation are A, B, and C, (ii) this combination of facts is 
readily explained if (39) is read as (39L), and (iii) this combination cannot be explained 
if (39) is read as (39s).
16. Second formulation of the argument for a small scope reading
There is another argument for (39s) we need to examine, an argument put forward by 
*king, who thinks that the positions of both ′king and the sceptic are confused about 
what needs to be explained. 
*king agrees with ′king and the sceptic that we cannot afford to overlook the distinction 
between the content of the proposition I expressed by uttering (39) and the content of 
any propositions I pragmatically implied. but *king argues that both ′king and the 
sceptic have drawn the line in the wrong place and that when it is drawn in the right 
place the facts that need to be explained are slightly different. 
*king agrees facts A and B have to be explained. but *king argues that the reason B 
needs to be explained is because something stronger needs to be explained, viz. the 
more specific fact *B:
*B: by expressing whatever (true) proposition it was that I expressed, by uttering 
(39), I provided a satisfactory response to your question about sherry’s 
behaviour because I expressed the proposition that sherry’s behaviour is to 
be explained by her belief that Alan (is a guy who) has just been named cEO 
and hates her (a proposition that is, in fact, true).
*king accepts (or at least can accept) that the sceptic has provided a respectable 
pragmatic explanation of fact B. but, he points out, the more specific fact *B is left 
unexplained by the sceptic’s pragmatics because *B is a fact about the proposition I 
expressed and so not, like B, merely a fact about a proposition I communicated that can 
be explained in terms of a proposition I pragmatically implied.
What does *king make of ′king’s explanation of B? Well, if ′king appeals to (1) the 
Pragmatic Implication solution for completing his explanation of fact B, then *king 
rejects the explanation because it is *king’s contention that I expressed (rather than 
pragmatically implied) the proposition that sherry’s behaviour is to be explained by 
her belief that Alan (is a guy who) has just been named cEO and hates her. but if, 
by contrast, ′king appeals to either (2) Heavy-handed semantics (syntactic Ellipsis 
and LF) or (3) Heavy-handed Pragmatics (Utterance Ellipsis, Underdetermination, 
Unarticulated constituents) to complete the explanation of fact B, then ′king is, in fact, 
explaining B by virtue of explaining the stronger fact, *B, and *king has no complaint 
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whatsoever. Indeed, one of ′king’s ellipsis-based explanations of fact B is going to 
function as part of *king’s explanation of *B. 
What does *king say about C? He has to say, with ′king, that the third fact in need 
of explanation is not C but *C. so what we really have on our hands is another down 
and dirty fight about the semantics-pragmatics distinction, or rather the distinction 
between propositions expressed and propositions merely pragmatically implied:
• The sceptic about (39s) maintains that (i) the facts in need of explanation are A, B, 
and C, (ii) this combination of facts can be explained if (39) is read as (39L), and 
(iii) it cannot be explained if (39) is read as (39s). so there is no reason to posit 
(39s) and every reason to reject it. In order to explain B, the sceptic must solve the 
Missing Piece problem, of course, and happily adopts the Pragmatic Implication 
solution, happily assuming a distinction between the proposition I expressed by 
uttering (39) and any propositions I pragmatically implied.
• ′king, who quickly gave up on explaining C, maintains that (i) the facts to be 
explained are A, B, and C*, (ii) this combination of facts can be explained if (39) is 
read as (39s), and (iii) it cannot be explained if (39) is read as (39L). (but (iii), as we 
have seen, is just false.) In order to explain B, ′king must appeal to one of the three 
solutions to the Missing Piece Problem: (1) Pragmatic Implication,  (2) Heavy-
handed semantics, or (3) Heavy-handed Pragmatics. This yields three distinct 
versions of ′king’s position.. If ′king opts for (2) or (3), he ends up explaining 
something stronger than B, viz B*, along with *king, and indeed his final position 
may be identical to *king’s depending upon whether (2) or (3) is selected. In order 
to explain C*, ′king must assume a distinction between the proposition I expressed 
by uttering (39) and any propositions I pragmatically implied.
• *king maintains that (i) the facts in need of explanation are actually A, *B, and *C, 
(ii) this combination of facts can be explained if (39) is read as (39s), and (iii) (which 
is obviously true) it cannot be explained if (39) is read as (39L). In order to explain 
*B, *king must solve the Missing Piece problem like everyone else.76 Obviously 
76 recall reading (39) as (39s) provides an explanation of fact *B only if the proposition I expressed when (39) 
is read as (39s) entails the proposition that Sherry’s behaviour is to be explained by her belief that Alan has just 
been named CEO and hates her. but as already noted, it manifestly does not entail that proposition because it 
entails no proposition whatsoever about Sherry’s behaviour unless the proposition I express is at least as strong as 
the proposition I would have expressed had I uttered (39″). And that means endorsing either the Heavy-handed 
semantic (syntactic Ellipsis and LF) solution or the Heavy-handed Pragmatic (Utterance Ellipsis, Enrichment, or 
Unarticulated constituents) solution.
Given the question you asked me, certainly I intended to communicate to you, by uttering (39), an explanation 
of sherry’s behaviour (i.e., I intended you to construe me as giving you an explanation for her behaviour). but if 
(39) is read as (39s), then although I expressed a proposition that contains sherry having a certain thought, which 
itself has as part of its content the property expressed by the matrix ‘guy who was just named cEO’, and although, 
as a good, cooperative Gricean, I intended to be communicating to you in some way or other the proposition that 
sherry’s behaviour is to be explained by her belief that Alan has just been named cEO and hates her, I did not, on 
*king’s account actually express that proposition unless his position is beefed up with either the Heavy-handed 
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he must appeal to either (2) Heavy-handed semantics or (3) Heavy-handed 
Pragmatics (He cannot appeal to (1) Pragmatic Implication, of course, because that 
solution is based on abandoning the idea that the proposition I expressed is the 
proposition that sherry’s behaviour is to be explained by her belief that Alan has 
just been named cEO and hates her.) In order to explain C*, like ′king, *king 
must assume a distinction between the proposition I expressed by uttering (39) and 
any propositions I pragmatically implied. but, remember, both versions of *king’s 
theory, like all three versions of ′king’s theory, still predict, counterintuitively, that 
A still obtains in scene σ′, which differs from σ in one simple respect: Alan has not 
been named cEO but sherry and I both think he has.
Of course, some versions of ′king’s position are identical to some versions of *king’s, 
but it has proved useful to construct them separately, as I have in response to the 
(purported) facts that need to be explained.
The cogency of either of *king’s positions (and two of ′king’s) require either (i) that 
the logical form of the sentence I uttered when I uttered (39) is identical to the logical 
form of (39″),
(39″) sherry is behaving like that because sherry thinks that that guy who was just 
named cEO hates her
or (ii) that the proposition I expressed when I uttered (39) contains enough unarticulated 
constituents to make it identical to the proposition I would have expressed had I uttered 
(39″). so for *king’s argument to successfully demonstrate anything about the semantics 
of (39), the following must be true:
(i) The proposition I expressed by uttering (39) is identical to the proposition I 
would have expressed had I uttered (39″) because either (a) I really did utter a sentence 
whose LF is identical to the LF of (39″), or (b) the proposition I expressed contains as 
unarticulated constituents the behaviour of sherry’s that you were talking about in your 
question and the relation I could have put into that proposition by uttering the word 
‘because’.
(ii) The proposition I expressed by uttering (39) is the proposition obtained 
by reading (39″) as (39″s), where this is a reading upon which the demonstrative 
description ‘that man who was just named cEO’ occurring in the sentence ‘sherry 
thinks that that guy who was just named cEO hates her’ occurring on the right-hand 
semantic solution or the Heavy-handed Pragmatic solution to the Missing Piece Problem. The point is simple: 
whether (39) is read as (39L) or (39s), as originally portrayed, the proposition I expressed by uttering (39) is not 
the proposition that sherry’s behaviour is to be explained by her belief that Alan has just been named cEO and 
hates her. so reading (39) as (39s), as originally portrayed, can provide only part of an explanation of *B. *king 
needs additional machinery to finish the job, i.e. to make the proposition I expressed by uttering (39) much richer 
than (39s), as originally portrayed.
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side of ‘because’ has small scope in that sub-sentence. but what is the argument that 
this sub-sentence sentence can be read in this way? *king’s argument for a reading of 
(39) as (39s)? Obviously not. And what is it about the sub-sentence that prevents it 
from being read as (39″) itself, generating a regress?
In summary, if king = *king, then (a) his theory makes intuitively incorrect predictions 
(see the discussion of σ′), (b) he has not demonstrated that (39) can be read deictically 
as (39s), as originally portrayed, and (c) he must appeal to either (i) a controversial 
syntactic claim about the sentence I uttered, or (ii) a raft of unarticulated constituents 
in the proposition I expressed by uttering (39). And if king = ′king, then (a) he still 
has a theory that makes intuitively incorrect predictions (again, see the discussion 
of σ′) and (b) he must either (i) appeal to the Pragmatic Implication solution to the 
Missing Piece Problem and make a scene-reading error, or (ii) appeal to either (α) a 
controversial syntactic claim about the sentence I uttered, or (β) a raft of unarticulated 
constituents in the proposition I expressed by uttering (39), and so hold one of the 
positions *king holds.
It is worth noting finally that even if king had demonstrated that (39) can be read 
deictically as (39s), this would not have sealed the matter as far as some referentialists 
are concerned, in particular those who, following smiley’s lead in connection with a 
referential semantics of ‘the φ’, distinguish readings of the forms (s′) and (L′):
(s′) Ñψ(that φ)
(L′) (λxÑψx)(that φ).
The diagnosis of error has been rewarding. king’s argument that (39) can be read 
deictically as (39s), however it is spelled out, is a bad argument that should not worry 
the direct reference theorist about demonstrative descriptions or anyone else—which 
is not to say there might not be other arguments against direct reference analyses that 
are worrying.
There are three morals in all this. The first is that some of what passes for heavy-handed 
semantics isn’t, even by its own lights, heavy-handed enough to explain the data 
apparently motivating it. The second is that sometimes, as in the case of my utterance of 
(39), the best way of explaining certain important communicative facts about utterances 
is not to look for propositions expressed that have been concocted by semantically 
heavy-handed appeals to scope ambiguities, aphonics in syntax, or syntactic ellipsis, 
or by pragmatically heavy-handed appeals to enrichment, unarticulated constituents 
or utterance ellipsis, but to look at how mental states involving propositions expressed 
and propositions implied interact to produce results that speakers are seeking. One 
can easily overlook the obvious by focussing on just propositions expressed or just 
propositions implied. A third moral is that, despite the rhetoric, every semanticist 
appeals to pragmatic magic in determining the propositions we express, even the most 
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dogmatically heavy-handed. One can only sigh when encountering claims to the effect 
that linguistic meaning, formal contexts, and compositional machinery do all the work 
when a sentence is used on a given occasion, a context—actually, a sequence of shifting 
contexts—magically assigning “salient” objects, properties, sets, or functions to enough 
aphonic, non-constant, non-perspectival, non-descriptive, elements in that sentence to 
ensure the utterance has precisely the truth conditions the theorist judges it to have. 
Magic is magic, by whatever name, even when it can’t be seen or heard.
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